“Allies and Alliances in U.S. Security Strategy”
U.S. leadership in a changing world
A Presentation and Discussion on 15 April 2019 with
Brad Roberts, PhD
Director, Center for Global Security Research
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
“Who are our allies? Well…it depends…on when and where…”
Dr. Brad Roberts shared his insight and perspective on how allies and alliances have shaped U.S. foreign policy (and vice versa) over more than seven decades since the end of WWII. The question of who are U.S. allies has evolved over time and place, encompassing the “usual suspects” in some cases as was the case when NATO went to war in Afghanistan after the 9/11. At times, it includes unlikely partnerships with known adversaries, as was the case when Vladimir Putin pledged to join the United States and NATO in the Global War on Terror.
Some alliances such as NATO bind the participants through mutual aid treaty obligations that state an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliances are also not static. Originally at 14 members in 1949, NATO has now expanded to 30 members. And at times our friends may choose to withdraw their support for the U.S. as was the case when France and Germany opted out of joining the “Coalition of the Willing” in 2003 when we went to war in Iraq. In short, allies can at times be enablers of U.S. foreign policy and at times constraints when they disagree with U.S. actions. Other U.S. alliances (beyond NATO) are based on historical events, past conflicts or the need for strategic security cooperation. These include strategic partnerships with the Philippines, a former U.S. colony, or with countries in the Middle East that agree to work with the U.S. to counter extremism or keep Iran in check.
“Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation.” (President George Washington in his Farewell Address, 1796).
So, what is an equitable cost for our allies to pay for protection from the U.S. military? The Trump Administration has proposed NATO allies cover the full cost of housing American soldiers deployed to their countries plus and additional 50% “for the privilege of hosting them” according to recent reports (Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Jacobs in Bloomberg, 08 March 2019). This approach can be poisonous to alliances forged on mutual interests and common values. It does, however, harken to early American foreign policy at our founding, especially with regard to alliances with Europe. Long after President Washington’s Farewell Address, the U.S. forged a deep set of common interests and values with Europe in the last century that have helped promote global peace and security.
“Engagement abroad keeps the problem over there.”
Moving into the 20th Century, the U.S. developed a broader perspective on the role of allies and alliances. These roles morphed following the breakdown of the League of Nations after WWI and the outbreak of war again with WWII. After approximately 100 million people combined were killed in these wars, the U.S. shifted its foreign policy to favor engagement over isolation as an antidote to global conflict. Engagement became even more critical as the world abruptly transitioned to the “nuclear era” post WWII. Keeping “the problem over there” through strong alliances such as the United Nations and NATO was the expedient and safest way to protect U.S. national security. Alliances for peace, beyond those just for war, underpin global stability and minimize conflict.
Threats from Islamic extremists advocating for the creation of a caliphate with the entire world under Islamic rule, are best countered through strong and sustained partnerships among those who share a commitment to open and inclusive values and forms of governance. Invoking the NATO pledge that “an attack on one is an attack on all” to go to war in Afghanistan after the attacks of 9/11, was a testament to the power of one of the world’s most powerful alliances. NATO and our South Asia partners turned on short notice and fought on behalf of the U.S., allowing us to avoid having to “go it alone” and bear the full burden of the fight.
Recruiting “a posse” of likeminded allies is especially valuable in standing down adversaries armed with or aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons, i.e., Iran and North Korea. Alliances also allow the U.S. to share responsibilities as well as burdens. If the U.S. were forced to consider deploying or threatening to deploy nuclear weapons in conflict, we need our staunchest allies at the table when that decision is made, even if in the end it falls on the U.S. to act. Sharing this responsibility strengthens (not diminishes) our national security.
“We exercise leadership by generating followership when we exercise power.” (Vice President Dick Cheney)
Alliances require leadership. What constitutes U.S. leadership has changed at least three times since the Bush Administration and 9/11. Dick Cheney’s view was that power begets leadership because others will follow if they believe they are “on the winning side.” In contrast, the Obama Administration pursued leadership through sustained dialogue with allies to identify common values and a common agenda to counter common threats. This approach, pejoratively referred to as “lead from behind,” encouraged our allies to assume more responsibility and to stand up and exercise leadership within their own areas of influence. In the current Administration, U.S. leadership appears to be relegated to a quaint idea of the 20th century, as evidenced in the Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy that avoids using the term almost entirely. Three visions of U.S. leadership promoted by three U.S. Administrations since 2001 has created confusion among our allies as to what role the U.S. intends to play on the global stage.
“They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner.” (President Vladimir Putin to the Russian Duma, 18 March 2014, in reference to U.S. and our allies)
Looking forward, Dr. Roberts delved into the challenges facing our alliances. The first and foremost challenge is Russia and China. Both countries resent the U.S. for maintaining and expanding post Cold War alliances that were designed to keep them in check. President Xi Jinping of China has given several talks denouncing U.S. alliances as a means of repressing China’s rightful return to a place of dominance in a multipolar world. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has similarly and repeatedly criticized the expansion of NATO in his backyard.
Blackmail and brinksmanship are the primary tactics used by Putin (and sometimes Xi) to seed dissent and fracture long-standing bonds between the U.S. and our allies. By separating our allies from the U.S. and from each other, Russia hopes to weaken the resolve and effectiveness of the U.S. to counter the return of Russia to global hegemony. Russia’s Strategy for Regional War, 25 years in development, sets the conditions for Russia winning a “short war” against Western targets in Europe (e.g. NATO) including the employment of nuclear weapons “to sober, not enrage” the enemy.
While NATO focused its attention on conflicts in Afghanistan and elsewhere over the last 10 years, Russia has been modernizing its defense infrastructure including increasing by a factor of 30 its weapons platforms (nuclear and conventional) capable of striking Europe. Russia is not alone, Iran has developed and tested a collection of missiles with ranges up to 4000km capable of striking all countries in NATO except the U.S. and Canada.
As pressure mounts from China and Russia our allies are feeling the squeeze. Through personal exchanges relayed to Dr. Roberts from his Japanese counterparts, we learned that Japan is experiencing mounting pressure from China and North Korea. North Korea continues to flex its nuclear muscles in the region and Japan is stuck housing U.S. troops that would be deployed to defend South Korea in the event of an invasion from the north. This leaves Japan feeling vulnerable and alone in the Pacific, leading them to question if the alliance with the U.S. is worth of being in the crosshairs of its nearest neighbors.
Do we, the U.S., continue to strengthen our defense posture in Europe and the Pacific, or do we just ‘opt out’?
As Kim Jong Un of North Korea raises the ante and postures about its nuclear plans targeting the U.S. homeland, our allies in the Pacific have begun to question the resolve of the U.S. to come to their defense if U.S. cities and military bases are held at risk. This tactic of “ally decoupling,” commonly used during the Cold War, continues to be used by China, Russia, and others bent on fraying the fabric of U.S. strategic alliances. Begging the question, would the U.S. really go to war to defend our allies in Europe and Asia if the U.S. homeland was also a target.
Dr. Roberts reminded us that NATO is an alliance that by self-definition has no enemies and maintains nuclear plans against no country. However, it still maintains the ability to plan for nuclear war. Using a geographically constrained map with a Cold War target list, NATO plans for nuclear war (daily) just as it did when the Soviet Union loomed large over Europe.
“What this Administration has done is ask our allies to sign up for America First”
Another growing concern among our allies is our credibility. Deterrence depends on our adversaries and our allies believing without doubt that the U.S. will respond with might and resolve every time we or our friends are attacked or threatened. When the President openly criticizes our strongest alliances Russia, China and North Korea are emboldened to push the limits and Europe and Asia grows more distrustful that the U.S. will stand-up against them. Uncertainty on all sides puts our allies in the crosshairs just when they and we need alliances more than ever to counter new and emerging global threats.
In closing Dr. Roberts harkened back to the U.S. in the 1930s, the interwar period when the U.S. was not up to the challenge of maintaining strategic alliances. This was a time when the U.S. couldn’t decide if it wanted to be relevant and engaged in the hard work of maintaining global peace and stability. We were reticent to invest in our own military capabilities. And we allowed internal ideological internal debates drive our national security decision-making. The outcome was chaos then WWII. There is another option. A proven path to avoid the turmoil the U.S. faced during and after WWII is to keep our alliances healthy and our adversaries in check.
Questions for Dr. Roberts covered a range of topics starting with an inquiry about whether NATO would really invoke Article 5 and go to war for its newest members such as Romania, Montenegro or Latvia. During the Cold War it seemed obvious that if Russia chose to invade Europe it would not stop on the margins, making Article 5 an obvious necessity. Today is less obvious that an incursion into the border NATO states by Russia would be seen by all NATO members as an existential threat. That said, Putin may just find that the resolve of the alliance grows exponentially stronger in the wake of an actual attack. To make the alliance stronger in the near-term, Dr. Roberts suggested that NATO should develop a high-level military-political plan focused on Russia. The alliance, as a whole, needs to decide collectively when it will engage with Russia diplomatically and militarily and when it will not.
As for what constitutes “stop” or a red line in the European forest for countries such as Ukraine that are outside but in close proximity to NATO, Dr. Roberts was less convinced that NATO was up to the task. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has lost its buffer zone and it grows more aggressive as its former buffers join NATO. Russia is now set on recreating the buffer through “frozen conflicts” in places like Ukraine and Georgia. Although effective in the short-term in pre-positioning Russian troops on Europe’s doorstep, this tactic leaves Mr. Putin with a gaggle of quagmires that are very costly and unsustainable.
What does an alliance look like for countering China? Dr. Roberts was quite clear that it certainly does not look like NATO. Currently the U.S. only engages in bilateral alliances in Asia. If we were to attempt to build a multi-lateral alliance focused on countering China, our allies will likely decline to participate. Our Asian partners live in the region and like it or not China is their neighbor and trading partner.
China is not Russia. According to Dr. Roberts, Russia is at the peak of its power and its geopolitical decline, however prolonged and ugly, will continue. In contrast, China is on the rise and the challenge for the U.S. is to balance both cooperation and competition with China. With Russia there is scant cooperation and plenty of competition. With China the U.S. must maintain both. Despite the current trade war, we share economic and some political interests with China. Xi has adopted the long view, working to reform the world order to ensure it is recognized as a leader in a multipolar world. Putin, on the other hand, appears more determined on undermining world order by sowing chaos, bolstering him only in the short run.
Moving to transnational threats, Dr. Roberts admitted that traditional alliances may be not be inherently structured to counter extremist groups such as ISIS. They are, however, a valuable starting point. As was the case after 9/11, NATO was the genesis of the Coalition of the Willing. Building alliances around common values and interests may be the best approach to countering uncommon threats.
Dr. Roberts deftly addressed the question about what alliances look like in cyber or outer space. Allies and alliances are the same except with the addition of the private sector. If there is a war in space it will have originated in a war on the ground. Access to and communications in cyber and outer space are now primarily the domain of the private sector, as such our current alliances must be flexible enough to incorporate new industry partners. This will be challenging for both individual countries and multilateral alliances, but it will be essential for countering threats away from terra firma.
As the global economy enters a potential slowdown, the U.S. will benefit from alliances based on shared economic as well as military interests. Promoting an America First posture that negates these shared interests undermines confidence among our allies that the U.S. will remain a reliable partner. Dr. Roberts shared feedback gleaned from our strategic partners in the UK and other countries. Despite having complete confidence in our military capabilities and monetary resources they are far less confident in our resolve. Our current alliances, including NATO, may not be here in 10 years if our will to lead continues to wane.
Look ahead 5 years, Dr. Roberts opined on what it will take for the U.S. to strengthen our alliances for peace as well as war. First, we must develop solutions with our allies to counter the growing threats from Russia and China. Second, the U.S. needs to make it clear to the world what role we intend to play now and in the future. Our allies want us to lead, not withdraw. Third, we need to step away from the precipice of 1939. When we withdrew into isolationism in the 1930s, we signaled weakness to our adversaries. Even so, the America of Pearl Harbor and 9/11 was not weak and did not fail when called to act. Finally, resolving our internal disputes and demonstrating our resolve to lead at home and abroad is the bedrock of our national security.
Dr. Brad Roberts is director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research. Previously he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy (2009-2013). In this role, he served as Policy Director of the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review and had lead responsibility for their implementation. From 1995 to 2009, Dr. Roberts was a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia and an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University. His book, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford University Press), was recognized by the American Library Association as one of the outstanding academic titles of 2016. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Roberts has a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Stanford University, an MA. from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a PhD in international relations from Erasmus University.
For more information about Dr. Robert’s work and the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at LLNL go to: https://cgsr.llnl.gov