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The Hungry Bear in The Sandbox Special Analysis for the NSF by Michael Haas

The Hungry Bear in The Sandbox Special Analysis for the NSF by Michael Haas

The Hungry Bear in The Sandbox

  • Special Analysis for the NSF by Michael Haas

‘If order [in Syria] cannot be achieved by consensus or imposed by force, it will be wrought, at disastrous and dehumanizing cost, from the experience of chaos.’

                  Henry Kissinger, World Order

Claims emanating from the White House this week describing Russia’s recent escalation of military power in Syria as ‘a sign of weakness’ have a distinctly hollow ring.  When presidents find themselves unable to respond effectively to an opponent’s public challenge, their ‘default response of choice’ often leads them to redefine the challenge in whatever manner excuses their inaction.

This brief analysis asserts that, contrary to President Obama’s claims, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s latest move is not wrought from political weakness at all. Rather it is but the first-phase execution of a well-thought-out plan; one bearing the potential of immediate and enormous political rewards should it succeed.

‘Order in Syria’, as described by Dr. Kissinger, is about to be imposed by ruthless force, launched by powers with a high degree of confidence in their capability to achieve their goals.  The plan is as sophisticated as it is lethal, and its prime architects are Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

With the pace of political events seemingly accelerating by the day in a region where reality is rarely what meets the eye, Putin’s latest geo-strategic move in the Middle East is proving a master stroke.  As President Obama and European leaders flounder in their belated attempts to respond, a massive ‘win-win’ for Moscow and Tehran now lie within their grasp.  And if the shrewd Putin schedules his regional withdrawal correctly, the many positives he will walk away with will likely prove of historical consequence.  Viewed from a chronological perspective, it looks something like this:

        The Immediate (1-6 months) Positive for Moscow:  Putin reminds the world’s many authoritarian regimes that when he is your mentor you indeed have support that can make the difference between survival or . . . Qadaffi’s fate in the back of a pickup truck.    As for Syria—with five nations on its borders—the impact domestically and regionally is hard to overstate.

To Syria’s ruler, Bashar al Assad, Putin’s gambit is a lifeline; to his neighbors a reminder they too will now have to accommodate the new sheriff in town. It’s also an ‘immediate positive’ to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—with whom the Assad regime has been known to cut political dope deals—as ISIS is not the primary target in the Russian crosshairs.

The Interim (6-12 months) Positive for Moscow:  While the Shia sect of Islam represents only some 15% of all Muslims, the fact that most of them are found in oil-rich, strategically-located Iran makes the enhancement of their cooperation with Moscow well worth the effort from the Kremlin’s point of view. Seriously influencing the Sunni-led countries never was in the cards. 

Of note is the historical linkage between the Persian Shia and the Alawite sect of Islam that form the backbone of the Assad regime.  Syria was, after all, the one Arab country that reached out to support the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the Persians have never forgotten the Alawite’ assistance.  And with Iraq, Turkey, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon on its borders, Syria remains of immense value to Russian and Iranian ambitions in the Middle East. 

Nor do the regional prizes awaiting astute Russian plucking stop here.  Sandwiched in between Syria, and Iran and for the moment at least too weak to determine its own path, lies an Iraq already on public record asking for Putin’s help.  It, too, is Shia dominated.

Last, but hardly least, is the spectacle of Putin on the global stage, proudly proclaiming that Russia is confronting ISIS terrorism (no matter the fraud here) even as the Obama Administration publicly admits the fiasco surrounding its five hundred million dollar attempt to do the same.

And who’s not for somebody doing something about the growing ISIS menace?  The frosting on this particular cake is the public specter of an American president seemingly in denial, coming out on the wrong end of the zero-sum game called international competition.  With just a bit of historical luck and a touch of political deftness, events appear to be folding-in quite nicely from Moscow’s point of view.

‘Long-term’ (12 months-plus) Positive for Moscow:  Putin returns Russia as a power to be reckoned with on the world stage, leaving America’s ‘reset strategy now looking like a miscalculation of historical proportion.  With continued Russian help Iran’s unrelenting march to nuclear weapons is hastened, even as Tehran’s proxy terrorists (Hezbollah, Hamas) continue to weaken Israel.  So too a weakened European Union will reconsider its relations with Putin vis-à-vis the U.S.

Despite the bleak picture offered here the author urges his readers to keep in mind the ‘long term’ view I forward is defined as a mere twelve-months-plus in duration.  With a nod to the exponentially-increasing pace of events in the Middle East, it may not take even this long before it becomes clear to all that the brutal Russian war machine is not the answer to Islam’s growing civil war.  [Note:  Nor is America’s drone warfare]

Thus much—nearly all—depends on the timing and manner of Putin’s withdrawal from direct combat in the Middle East.  The clear and present danger here is that a global competitor has publicly seized the initiative from a seemingly-outmatched Obama, an already weakened president with more than a full year still left in his lame-duck administration.

This Russian escalation in Syria cannot help but ‘pour gas on the fire’ as President Obama has correctly observed, but does that necessarily translate into a negative outcome as seen from Moscow?  Does a dominant Iran threaten Russian interests?  How would a war-fueled interruption of Persian Gulf oil exports affect world oil prices?  Would the European Union really continue its current sanctions on oil-rich Russia in the event of regional war in the Middle East?

Clearly someone in the Kremlin has thought through such questions and no doubt many more.  And just as clearly, they like the answers they find.

  • Col. Michael Haas, (USAF, ret.), served in the Pentagon as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst and Low Intensity Conflict specialist.  Haas has considerable experience as an Army as well as Air Force Special Operations Officer, including flying in an assault helicopter squadron, and with Rander and PsyOps units.  He has conducted government-related and private industry activities throughout the Middle East and Persia.  He lives in Northern Virginia.