Tyrus W. Cobb
June 27, 2010
CONSPICUOUS RESTRAINT AND TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS
In the wake of GEN Stanley McChrystal’s (M4) resignation last week, there has been considerable speculation regarding possible changes in the U.S. strategy for prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. In particular, some have stated that with his assumption of command in Kabul of NATO/ISAF forces, GEN Dave Petraeus (P4) will revise the current stringent Rules of Engagement (ROEs), adopt more aggressive tactics in the field, and even “stand up to the civilians in the White House” who have allegedly “shackled the military”.
They are dead wrong. The “Counterinsurgency” (COIN) strategy being pursued in Afghanistan has been devised by military professionals and is being implemented as the Defense Department has requested. In fact, if there is a civilian-military split over the conduct of the war, it is that some highly-placed civilian officials would favor less of an emphasis on “winning the hearts and minds” of the populace and more reliance on a “counter-terrorism” strategy; i.e., less concern with nation-building but a focus on striking hard and deep against known or suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets (VP Biden has been the primary proponent of this approach).
Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Afghanistan
The architects of the COIN strategy for winning the struggle in Afghanistan are Generals Dave Petraeus (US Army) and Jim Mattis (US Marine Corps), as laid out in the combined Field Manual 3-24. The key precepts of this doctrine are that victory will come when the citizens of Afghanistan render allegiance to the government in Kabul, reject the threats or incentives of the Taliban, are able to pursue a livelihood in a secure environment, and refuse sanctuary to terrorist forces. The mission is to deliver security and connect Afghans to their government.
This is to be accomplished not by “body counts” or blowing up villages indiscriminately, but by being embedded with the Afghans themselves and meeting with Afghan elders to learn their concerns and needs. Troops must exercise restraint in the application of force, deploy to small outposts, and focus on economic development. This strategy relies heavily on a cadre of Western reconstruction experts being available, a relatively honest and functional central government in Kabul, the transition of the Afghan Army and national police to an effective fighting and security force, and citizen willingness to inform on Taliban/AQ insurgent locations.
Even the most forceful of the adherents of this doctrine admit that progress in all of these areas has been slow, and that victory—however defined—will not come quickly or cheaply. At best it entails the commitment of American troops, and increasingly civilians, and billions—maybe even a trillion– of dollars for at least a decade.
More Restrictive Rules of Engagement
Generals Petraeus and McChrystal and their superiors are in lock step on the wisdom of this approach. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argues that “Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way……The battlefield is not necessarily a field anymore. It is in the minds of the people”. He argues that in this war restrictions must be placed on use of indirect fires, drones and long range artillery/naval gunfire, saying that, with respect to the application of force, “less really is more”.
Despite his background as a Special Operations warrior, M4 placed considerable restrictions on indiscrimate “knocking doors” down, especially limiting indirect fires and night raids. The “Tactical Directive on Night Raids”, which I have seen, stresses that night raids are the single biggest factor in lessening support for ISAF, that “all other options must be explored before effecting a night raid”, and, if employed, must be “judiciously used, tactically sound, and as transparent as possible”.
Going beyond these restrictions, the U.S. military has even begun awarding medals for “conspicuous restraint” in the application of force. That is, applauding the courage of the soldiers who, despite the potential of an insurgent ambush, exercise caution in place of the “shooting first, taking names later” philosophy. Obviously this stress on “population-centric” military action rankles some soldiers in the field who feel they are being asked to perform dangerous tasks in a very restrictive combat environment. The proscriptions seem to multiply as each lower level HQ seeks to implement the ROEs, resulting in fewer patrols, less “kinetic” activity, and an avoidance of “incidents”.
M4 and his critics
We now have a professional military greatly influenced by Greg Mortensen (“Three Cups of Tea”), one now focused on nation-building, protecting the population, constructing schools, training Afghan security forces, and exercising “restraint” on the battlefield. So much so that conservative former prosecutor Andrew McCarthy charges that M4, who voted for Obama it appears, is “for his entire undeniable valor, a progressive big-thinker who has been conducting a sociology experiment in Islamic nation-building”. He charges that our troops are under “increasingly straight-jacketed ROEs imposed by GEN McChrystal to avoid offending Afghans”. Too much emphasis on drinking tea with Afghan elders at too many Shuras in order to insure the possibility of the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, he argues!
Other critics, such as George Will, were taken aback by some of the lesser noted revelations in the Rolling Stone piece on the “Runaway General”. Specifically, M4’s predilection for a “Zen” approach to combat—he liked to be called the Zen Master and instructed his staff to provide him a Bruce Lee quote on a daily basis. I guess that what M4 aspired to is to be the synthesis of “warrior” and “reflective philosopher” as embodied in Zen philosophy.
In contrast, the Obama-Panetta-Biden Trio Stresses Aggressive Tactics
It seems that the Obama administration feels less shackled by a “pop-centric” COIN strategy, and is relying increasingly on drone attacks against suspected AQ/Taliban strongholds, not only in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other locales. Critics have charged that the Predator/UAV attacks and secret employment of Special Ops forces under CIA control against suspected targets is, in reality, an illegal scheme of “targeted assassinations”.
That charge is not without grounds. The clearest public description of this doctrine came from White House CT expert, John Brennan, who said that the U.S. “will not merely respond after the fact of a terrorist attack”, but will “take the fight to Al Qaeda and its extremist affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond”. Wow, sounds somewhat reminiscent of Bush 43’s “pre-emption doctrine”!
CIA Director Leon Panetta stated forcefully today that while “We don’t have an assassination list…..we do have a terrorist list”, and several suspected AQ/Taliban figures are on it, including some U.S. citizens. The White House and Panetta’s Agency and his forces seem bound by much less restrictive Rules of Engagement! (You might want to Google Panetta’s appearance on “This Week” today—he comes across sounding more like George Patton than George Kennan!)
So is there really a civil-military split and what are the core differences?
Yes, there is, but a much different one than you normally hear. The professional military approach, one supported by Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, stresses that this conflict will be prolonged and difficult, that the military needs to have the resources (manpower, money and many more civilian experts) to conduct the COIN strategy over time, and that the Commander in Chief needs to be more vociferous in enunciating and demanding support for the commitment. While all key players in the chain of command signed on to the July 2011 reduction of troops, the military will be resisting, saying that can happen only if “conditions on the ground warrant”.
In contrast, the civilian leadership is very worried about the human and monetary drain Afghanistan represents, that the effort has lost the support of the voters who see this increasingly as a quagmire, and that it is only one of many crises the administration must address—the Oil Spill, a second recession, accelerating deficits, health care, and, yes, climate change! The White House will be leaning toward troop withdrawals, shifting to a “counter-terrorism” strategy, and looking for an attractive “exit strategy”.
Stay tuned!
Tyrus W. Cobb