The Intelligence Community, Policymakers
And the Politicization of Intelligence
– Observations from veteran Intelligence Community (IC) analysts compiled by Keith Hansen that grew from a Forum on the politicization of intelligence.
The recent incident where CENTCOM supposedly changed an intelligence assessment to better support its operational goals, if true, is another example of how the Intelligence Community-Policy Community relationship can become dysfunctional.
The Intelligence Community exists for one purpose only – to help protect US security interests at home and abroad by supplying policymakers (civilian and military) timely, relevant, and objective (i.e. unbiased) information. US intelligence may not promote or advocate policy options by withholding or skewing its information.
Senior policymakers throughout history have tried to influence intelligence analyses.
In the Reagan Administration, Bill Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with a number of senior policy officials, believed fervently in the Communist conspiracy. The then Director of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) at the CIA (and later Executive Director), Rae Huffstutler, recalls a case where a friend was researching the Communist hand in Indonesian politics and couldn’t find any evidence supporting such influence. Casey told him to go back and look harder! Indeed, during his subsequent confirmation hearings for the directorship of CIA, Bob Gates, who had previously served as Casey’s deputy, was accused of having politicized intelligence.
Senior policymakers certainly exert pressure on intelligence to support their points of view. (This happens also in academic research, politics, and the PTA, so it isn’t unique to intelligence.) Whether findings are altered, however, depends as much on the character, especially honesty and integrity, of the researcher as on the line of command. Rae recalls sending forward a major paper that concluded the Soviets had stopped growing their military investment, which had plateaued. This occurred when Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger was on the Hill seeking an increase in the US defense budget. The paper caused enormous angst with both Casey and Gates, but Rae came under no pressure to change or soften the conclusions. Instead, Casey forwarded the paper to the White House with a note that said, “Mr. President, we have a problem.” And it did lead to a considerable dispute on the Hill and with the Pentagon. We now know that the conclusions were accurate and that the decline of the USSR was starting to show even if the paper was controversial and unwelcome. Had either Casey or Gates suppressed the paper or attempted to alter the conclusions, Rae, their Director of Soviet Analysis, would have resigned, and he thinks they knew it.
More recently, during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, General Joe Shaefer, former Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), reminds us that there was much disagreement within the Intelligence Community over the alleged WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) in Iraq. The best of the old Arab hands said it was certainly “possible” that Saddam did the kabuki dance with the covered trucks hastening out the back gates as the UN inspectors came in the front, just to make his regional enemies, such as Iran, believe he had WMD and would use them.
Joe continues that when instructed to compile a list of possible sites where these weapons might be located, the DIA dutifully sent its best estimate. A “snowflake” (that’s what we called them since they floated down regularly from the Pentagon’s E Ring) came down from Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld’s office using words similar to those of Casey: “Too few. Work harder.” The additional few hundred possibilities added nothing to the reality on the ground, but it did place many more good troops in harm’s way.
We must realize and appreciate that senior policymakers by nature are action oriented and charged with making decisions in the best interests of the United States. They typically are smart, hardworking (and over worked) professionals who have many contacts and strong views about their responsibilities and policy objectives. At times, policymakers are clearly biased with regard to their views of the world and what the U.S. should be doing to promote its national security interests. When faced with tough decisions, policymakers seek help and advice from multiple sources; the Intelligence Community is only one of those sources, and policymakers are free to choose whose advice they will take.
Former National Intelligence Officer Keith Hansen cites an episode that demonstrates this phenomenon. In 1990 as the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union were falling apart and Iraq had moved into Kuwait, the Intelligence Community judged that Yugoslavia would soon come apart. However, it was the preferred US policy to keep that country together. Therefore, senior policymakers in Washington chose to ignore the IC’s judgments after having failed to influence them toward their preferred outcome. As a result, the U.S. was not as prepared as it could have been to deal with the breakup of Yugoslavia, including the subsequent tragedies in Bosnia and Serbia.
Keith recalls two other incidents that exemplify this situation. The first case involved debates over the success, or lack thereof, of US policy during the war in Vietnam. During the Johnson administration senior military and civilian policymakers resisted any notion that the course they were on was not succeeding as CIA’s analyses indicated. The second involved intelligence on Iraq in 2002. One National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) unanimously concluded that Saddam had chemical and possibly biological weapons, but no nuclear weapons. The only dispute was over how much progress, if any, Saddam had made in reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. It appears that intelligence analysts were convinced (perhaps intimidated) that any judgments to the contrary would be rejected out of hand by senior policymakers. Nevertheless, it appears that the NIE, which proved to be wrong, should have allowed for the possibility that Saddam had gotten rid of his chemical weapons. A second NIE correctly warned policymakers that removing Saddam would result in chaos. It is clear that senior policymakers chose to move forward despite the warning.
There are, of course, other situations where the Intelligence Community has made incorrect judgments or failed to coordinate properly, leaving policymakers stuck with situations that might have been avoided. Keith is reminded of debates prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when the Intelligence Community incorrectly judged that the Soviets would not put offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. Fortunately, the then-Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, took exception to his own community and judged that the Soviets would do so. He was correct!
Policymakers and Field Commanders Naturally Discount Intelligence that is not in concert with their policy preferences or courses of action.
Policymakers are on slippery ice when they refuse to listen to contrary views, or worse, intentionally change/skew the intelligence to protect their course of action, if not their careers! And intelligence must guard against being too timid to provide analyses which cast doubt on the wisdom of policy initiatives (i.e. speaking “truth” to “power”).
At the operational/tactical level, military officers in the field must make judgments based on the available intelligence in concert with their orders to achieve some objective. Therefore, the tendency is strong to discount any information that would tend to pour doubt on their ability to succeed. Many military “operators” often find their intelligence support less than satisfying and helpful because it fails to give them a clear understanding of the situation they face. And military minds, as most of us know, want their world to be as “black and white” as possible. After all, in most cases lives are at stake.
Therefore, in most circumstances, policymakers (both civilian and military) want and need information upon which they can act (i.e. actionable intelligence) and which hopefully reinforces their belief that they are pursuing the correct policy that will prove to be successful. Thus, information that contains large uncertainties is often frustrating to them. Because of the nature of intelligence (i.e. information that is not otherwise available and is often ambiguous), the Intelligence Community unfortunately often provides policymakers information and judgments that are less than satisfying and helpful. As a result, policymakers are forced to make the best decisions possible based on an incomplete understanding of a situation.
Nevertheless, both intelligence and policy officials owe it to each other to perform their duties professionally and with integrity for the benefit of the nation. The former must speak to “power” with the best information they have even when it will not be well-received. And the latter ought not try to intimidate, misconstrue or misuse the intelligence available to suit their particular policy bias. If these rules are violated, then the intelligence-policy relationship becomes dysfunctional and the potential positive synergy between them on behalf of US national security is at risk, if not lost all together.
Coordination is important to ensure relevant and unbiased intelligence.
General Frank Partlow, a former Deputy Director of the DIA for Estimates, reminds us that in the production of intelligence there is considerable coordination, formal and informal, within and among players in the Intelligence Community. It is not as though an individual can drive a particular analysis to the top without some give and take among his/her peer analysts and some review by more senior professionals who have sat where the analysts sit and are now responsible for reviewing the work of others. Those of us from the intelligence world know that DIA, CIA, State and to some degree the Service (Army, Navy, Air Force) intelligence folks all get their oars in the water, especially if they are the recognized experts on a particular issue. And the CINCs (operational and tactical commanders) benefit from this process and at times participate.
Having presented the advantages and importance of good coordination, former Air Force and Special Operations Colonel Mike Haas reminds us that there are times when the coordination process fails because of the need to protect sensitive information, strong institutional biases, or agency representatives are weak in their arguments which others find unconvincing. Nevertheless, any alternative view that has merit should be provided to the policy consumer. As mentioned in the case of McCone and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the minority view may prove to be correct.
The timeliness and objectivity of intelligence is critical, but the coordination within the Intelligence Community is often cumbersome, time-consuming, and frustrating. Nevertheless, some coordination is needed to ensure that biases are neutralized and that policymakers are served with the best collective judgments available. In the end, coordination provides a valuable service for the intelligence user. Documents like National Intelligence Estimates, which are widely coordinated, may at times be somewhat watered down, but they show the policymaker the limits of consensus within the Intelligence Community and where and why the controversies exist. Peer review typically exposes any missing evidence that has not been considered along with alternative viewpoints which should be included in the assessment. However, these intelligence products should never report soft or meek conclusions for the sake of policy convenience.
Back to the beginning: What does this review tell us about the current controversy regarding possible CENTCOM manipulation of intelligence?
Having laid out the process and challenges, we need to remember that CENTCOM is and has been the US warfighter since 9/11, and it wants the intelligence support and resources its operators need to win the fight. If this or any command were to stray across the line with the Intelligence Community from time to time, getting those resources (often at another CINC’s expense) might be the likely motivation.
However, as mentioned above with regard to achieving the political and military objectives in Vietnam and in the Iraq wars, all commands are under pressure to show Washington that their strategies and efforts to achieve the ordered goals are succeeding. Such pressure most likely plays a role today with regard to CENTCOM’s military operations in the Middle East and South Asia.
– Keith Hansen served as the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic Forces and Non-Proliferation. He holds a Masters Degrees from Stanford and The Johns Hopkins (SAIS) universities and is a retired Navy Captain. All participants in this exchange are members of the National Security Forum based in Reno.