“Diplomacy in National Security”
Why it works and when it doesn’t
A Presentation and Discussion on 08 February 2019 with
Ambassador Joseph G. Sullivan
Career Minister in the U.S. Senior Foreign Service (ret)
A Presentation and Discussion on 07 February 2019 with
Ambassador Joseph G. Sullivan
Career Minister in the U.S. Foreign Service (ret.)
Sharing insight from 38 years serving as a diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Joseph Sullivan began his presentation with the emphatic reminder that diplomacy, along with military power and economic strength, is a critical tool for securing the nation and advancing U.S. national interests. Diplomacy has at times been the means to avoid or limit the use of military force and at other times it has been a partner to the military in support of force deployments and conflict resolution actions.
Having served in Mexico, Portugal (post revolution), Israel, S. Lebanon (post war), Central America and Angola (post revolution) and Zimbabwe (during the reign of Robert Mugabe as President), Joe experienced the axiom first hand that “there are hundreds of problems in the world and the U.S. can’t fix them all.” Learning from his first post in Mexico in the early 1970s, during a time when Mexico was a desperately poor country with strong anti-American sentiments, Joe has witnessed many shifts in both U.S. and host country politics and culture. The U.S. has benefitted significantly from sustained engagement with countries like Mexico as they moved to more stable, democratic, and middle-income states.
Joe identified the key challenge facing most U.S. diplomats is finding ways to promote U.S. interests in countries during times of uncertainty and unrest. Sometimes, as in post-revolution Portugal, the U.S. objective of promoting democracy worked brilliantly. At other times, as in Israel during the 1980s, U.S. objectives to promote peace between Israel and the Palestinians, failed. Decades later the challenge of brokering peace in the Middle East remains a vexing and unresolved diplomatic challenge.
Moving to Central America, Joe learned that some situations are best handled quickly and not left to fester. By the late 1980s the U.S. was shifting from a foreign policy that engaged directly or indirectly in the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran civil wars to promoting conflict resolution and democratic institutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Under President George H.W. Bush, U.S. diplomats worked closely with U.S. military commanders, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United Nations to broker peace agreements between national governments and insurgent groups. The goal of these efforts was to allow democratic institutions and economic stability to gain traction in Central America. These efforts were in large part successful. However, as Joe reminded us, democracy and diplomacy are not a panacea. Decades later the region is still grappling with corruption, gangs, violence, and the drug trade. These issues continue to threaten to destabilize elected governments and demand more time, attention, and resources from the United States.
Serving in Cuba from 1993-1996 was a different type of diplomatic challenge. Lacking formal diplomatic relations with the Cuban Government, the large U.S. mission operated through its large U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba from September 1977 to July 2015. During the mid 1990s Cuba was “at the bottom economically and socially” following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of Soviet subsidies for the Fidel Castro regime. In response to pressure at home from the Cuban American community who strongly advocated for regime change in Cuba, the Clinton Administration did not pursue opening diplomatic relations. It did, however, open the door for more opportunities for non-governmental organizations to develop cultural exchanges with Cuban groups promoting people-to-people contact. Bridging the 90-mile chasm that separates the U.S and Cuba lingers on as a persistent diplomatic challenge.
Arriving in Angola as U.S. Ambassador in 1998 as the intermittent 27-year civil war was restarting, Joe initially oversaw U.S. contributions to food relief and humanitarian relief operations for the thousands of displaced civilians. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the main rebel group UNITA, was unwilling to “give peace a chance” with the Angolan government after years of conflict. This forced Joe to recommend that the U.S. choose sides in an attempt to accelerate an end to the civil war and protect U.S. interests. Why did the U.S. care so much about unrest in Angola? Oil. U.S. petroleum companies had large stakes in oil wells off the Angolan coasts in areas controlled by the Angolan government. The war eventually ended in 2002 after Savimbi was killed in conflict. Today, the new Angolan government has taken some steps to clean up corruption and invest in basic services for the population and U.S. petroleum companies are expanding their oil interests in the country.
Concluding with lessons learned from 38 years representing the U.S. around the world, Joe reminded us that there are times when the U.S. can be a force for good in the world, times when diplomacy can reduce the need for military operations, and times when diplomacy fails altogether. Decisions not to expend U.S. power (both diplomatically and militarily) can be as important as decisions to take action. Lack of engagement in regional conflicts may save U.S. blood and treasure in the short term but can lead to more unrest and instability in the long run. America is more powerful and prosperous when there are clear rules for engaging in the world and the U.S. benefits from developing these rules in partnership with our like-minded friends and allies. America’s economic well-being stems in large part from its global engagement. Diplomacy requires resources and less funding means less protection of U.S. interests abroad. China – having learned a lesson that the U.S. appears to have forgotten – increased its Foreign Ministry budget by 40% over the last few years, while the U.S. Administration proposed cutting funding for the U.S. Foreign Service by over 30%. A sober thought for the future of diplomacy and U.S. global leadership.
Fielding questions on a range of topics, Joe started with and inquiry about whether lessons learned from the U.S. interactions in Zimbabwe during the Mugabe regime applied to Venezuela now. In an attempt to constrain Mugabe, the U.S. implemented “smart sanctions” on Zimbabwean leaders, which had limited impact and influence on the regime due to a lack of economic ties between the U.S and Zimbabwe. Venezuela’s proximity to the U.S. and strong economic ties with the U.S. especially involving petroleum companies means that U.S. actions (such as sanctions) could be more impactful. Following the lead of the Lima Group, the U.S. has also recognized the Assembly Leader, Juan Guaido, as the country’s Interim President. In the near term, Joe strongly advocates for the U.S. to increase humanitarian aid to help lessen the refugee and internal social crises rather than considering any military actions.
In comparing U.S. past actions in Chile to our current position on Venezuela, Joe reminded us that when the U.S. supported a brutal military coup in Chile in the 1970s we were steeped in a deep Cold War mindset. Driven by the fear of communism and socialism, the U.S. was willing to openly support the overthrow of a democratically elected government. U.S. foreign policy has changed significantly since then and our backing for Guaido stems from U.S. support for democratic (not authoritarian) leaders in the region. If military actions are warranted, Joe cautions that Latin American nations should take the lead. Instead the U.S. should be the strong advocate and leader for humanitarian relief and economic reconstruction.
Turning to the Israel-Palestinian situation, Joe reminded us that even though peace is in both Israel and the Palestinians best interest, the U.S. cannot force them into an agreement. We have tried and failed many times. The U.S. can only urge and encourage dialogue. Joe cautioned that if the situation continues unresolved into the future, Israel will face the problem of ruling over a Palestinian majority west of the river Jordan and the U.S will lose credibility and limit our ability to influence other situations in the region.
On the topic of what diplomatic tools work and why, Joe succinctly stated that diplomacy is first and foremost about building relationships with foreign partners and their people. This is done through long, sustained people-to-people contact and through media outreach. To be successful in the long run, these relationships must be two-way benefitting both U.S. interests and the interests of the host country. Diplomatic success (and sometimes failures) takes time, energy and resources.
Leveraging relationships established during peaceful times is essential to acting both diplomatically and militarily in times of conflict. It also pays dividends following major world events such as the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Joe and others leveraged their diplomatic channels with Russia post-USSR to lessen tensions in Central America.
His parting thoughts for the next generation in the audience, were upbeat and encouraging. Despite the plethora of “isms” swirling around the U.S. right now (socialism, conservatism, racism, nationalism, globalism etc.), Joe believes Americans support U.S. diplomatic efforts to build bridges, reduce conflicts, and expand our leadership around the world. Jobs and trade are international as are social networks and many of our day-to-day activities. Engaging the world through strong diplomatic channels makes the U.S. more (not less) secure and promotes our interests abroad and at home.
Ambassador Joseph G. Sullivan, retired in 2008 as a Career Minister in the United States Senior Foreign Service with 38 years of diplomatic service in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe. AMB Sullivan served as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe from 2001-2004, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Angola from 1998-2001, Chief of Mission of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba from 1993-1996 and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1988-1992. AMB Sullivan served as Diplomat in Residence at Tulane University from 2004-2006, and while there, was designated as the Secretary of State’s personal representative to coordinate the Department of State’s efforts to coordinate international assistance and assist international victims in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. In 2017, he became Chair of the Foreign Service Association of Northern California. He has published a memoir, “A Diplomat’s Journey from the Middle East to Cuba to Africa” in 2014. AMB Sullivan received Presidential Distinguished Service Awards in 1993 and 2004. He has an M.A. degree in Government from Georgetown University and a B.A. from Tufts University and speaks Portuguese, Spanish, Hebrew and French. Joe was born in Boston, Massachusetts and has two sons.
Additional Information Provided:
Joe provided the following points to address additional questions following the formal presentation regarding funding for U.S. Diplomacy
The State of the State Department and Foreign Service:
- Hiring has resumed and Congress provided full funding, but the State Department continues to feel the loss of senior career leadership that took place in 2017.
- 9 in 10 Americans favor a strong global leadership role for the United States and a well-resourced, professional Foreign Service deployed around the world is critical to protect and defend America’s people, interests and values.
- Last year, the Department of State faced an unprecedented series of challenges which risked dismantling the U.S. Foreign Service and, with it, America’s diplomatic capability. A proposal by OMB to cut the Foreign Affairs Budget by 32% led the Secretary of State to pursue a sustained hiring freeze – both for new officers and eligible family members – that assumed passage by Congress of these steep cuts and to cut promotions into and within the Senior Foreign Service by more than 50%. When the dust settled, the Senior Foreign Service officer corps at the Department of State was seriously depleted.
- In April 2018 the hiring freeze ended and through the support of a bi-partisan group of Congressional allies and outspoken members of the public and the media, Congress voted to fully fund the State Department’s budget for FY 2018 at $55.9 billion.
- The Omnibus funding bill approved only in February 2019 included language instructing that appropriated funds “shall” be used to maintain State staffing at September 2016 levels and meet the goals of the December 2017 National Security Strategy which concludes that in the face of escalating threats, “we must upgrade our diplomatic capabilities to compete in the current environment”
- While funding and hiring have returned to normal levels, the State Department continues to grapple with the impact of the serious depletion of the Senior Foreign Service Officer corps. Almost half of the top-level jobs are still empty including many Ambassador vacancies, some in key geopolitical countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Turkey, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Egypt and Jordan.
- The State Department is also facing a longer-term trend — spending on core diplomatic capability has declined substantially over the last decade. A comparison of the annual Congressional Budget Justifications for the State Department in 2008 with 2016 shows a dramatic decline in spending on core diplomatic capability — from one dollar in 2008 to just 76 cents in 2016.
- The overall Foreign Affairs Budget has grown, largely due to increased spending on global health, humanitarian assistance, and security. This overall growth masked the decline in funding for political, economic, and public diplomacy sections which faced additional pressure from giving up positions to meet the demand to surge civilians into Iraq and Afghanistan.
- While U.S. defense spending easily outstrips the competition – at $700 billion a year, it is more than 10 times what Russia spends, and more than the next eight countries combined — our spending on diplomacy in comparison is decidedly modest, with just $5 billion going annually to core diplomacy a consistent budget category in the Congressional Budget Justifications.
- The U.S. can’t lead the world by short-changing diplomacy, particularly in the face of rising competition. In the last five years, China increased spending on diplomacy by 40% while America’s spending on core diplomacy fell by a third from $7.4 billion in 2013 to $4.9 billion in 2018. The U.S. still leads the world with 277 diplomatic missions, but China is fast catching up with 268.