Colleagues: Two very different perspectives on the war in Afghanistan today. As I have noted, I am amazed at the rapidity in the shift of opinions written by national security experts over just the past two months toward the conclusion that continuing the war in Afghanistan is a losing proposition. This is a viewpoint now held by a significant swath of the informed experts.
Just a couple months back it seemed like our small sub-group of the NSF here in Reno focusing on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan was operating on the margins of the mainstream of strategic thought when we began discussing “Option B”–what does the U.S. do when it becomes clear the struggle is not worth the cost, the price too high to bear?
Suddenly this has become the common denominator!
While this seems to be a conclusion many of us have reached, and most national experts, the question came up–Have the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, GEN Petraeus, etc., come to the same conclusion? And, if so, what course of action do they propose?
First, below, a statement by the National Security Advisor, GEN James Jones, commenting on leaks that appeared in the media regarding pessimistic assessments by U.S. officials on the war, and, particularly, on the double game that Pakistan (especially the ISI) is playing in actively assisting the Taliban and the insurgents. I include this statement not so much on the condemnation of the leaks, but that Jones strongly reemphasizes what would happen should the U.S. falter in its commitment and that we will be staying the course.
The 2nd piece summarizes the shift in strategic thinking against the war, with even the most enthusiastic advocates of COIN now apparently hoisting the white flag. Both pieces highlighted and abridged. — Ty
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release July 25, 2010
Statement of National Security Advisor GEN James Jones on Wikileaks
The United States strongly condemns the disclosure of classified information by individuals and organizations which could put the lives of Americans and our partners at risk, and threaten our national security. Wikileaks made no effort to contact us about these documents – the United States government learned from news organizations that these documents would be posted. These irresponsible leaks will not impact our ongoing commitment to deepen our partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan; to defeat our common enemies; and to support the aspirations of the Afghan and Pakistani people.
On December 1, 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy with a substantial increase in resources for Afghanistan, and increased focus on al Qaeda and Taliban safe-havens in Pakistan, precisely because of the grave situation that had developed over several years. This shift in strategy addressed challenges in Afghanistan that were the subject of an exhaustive policy review last fall. We know that serious challenges lie ahead, but if Afghanistan is permitted to slide backwards, we will again face a threat from violent extremist groups like al Qaeda who will have more space to plot and train. That is why we are now focused on breaking the Taliban’s momentum and building Afghan capacity so that the Afghan government can begin to assume responsibility for its future. The United States remains committed to a strong, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan.
Since 2009, the United States and Pakistan have deepened our important bilateral partnership. Counter-terrorism cooperation has led to significant blows against al Qaeda’s leadership. The Pakistani military has gone on the offensive in Swat and South Waziristan, at great cost to the Pakistani military and people. The United States and Pakistan have also commenced a Strategic Dialogue, which has expanded cooperation on issues ranging from security to economic development. Pakistan and Afghanistan have also improved their bilateral ties, most recently through the completion of a Transit-Trade Agreement. Yet the Pakistani government – and Pakistan’s military and intelligence services – must continue their strategic shift against insurgent groups. The balance must shift decisively against al Qaeda and its extremist allies. U.S. support for Pakistan will continue to be focused on building Pakistani capacity to root out violent extremist groups, while supporting the aspirations of the Pakistani people.
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July 22, 2010
Afghanistan Exit Strategy Watch
Posted by Michael CohenSo I’m about to do something decidedly unwise; I’m going to go a bit out on a limb in predicting where things are headed with the US mission in Afghanistan. As you can see from the title above; I have a sneaking suspicion that something has dramatically changed about the national discourse regarding our policy in Afghanistan.
The first and most obvious sign – and perhaps the catalyst for change – was the replacement of Stanley McChrsytal with David Petraeus. As I wrote at the time, President Obama was getting rid of a general who seemed to be operating under the premise that the US could win in Afghanistan (and was in it for the long haul) versus one who has shown a history of more pragmatic behavior and a better understanding of political realities.But really since then it feels like the whole narrative on Afghanistan has changed. Once upon a time US options in Afghanistan were reduced, in popular debates, to staying the course or cutting and running. But in recent weeks you’ve had Robert Blackwill call for de jure partition of Afghanistan; Richard Haass is now arguing that Afghanistan is not worth it and we need to drawdown; Fareed Zakaria is expressing incredulity at the level of US commitment to Afghanistan to combat a minimal threat. Hell even Newt Gingrich said things “won’t end well” there.
And today in the New York Times, David Sanger makes the following observation, “Mr. Obama has begun losing critical political figures and strategists who are increasingly vocal in arguing that the benefits of continuing on the current course for at least another year, and probably longer, are greatly outweighed by the escalating price.”
Aside from John Nagl, it’s getting harder and harder to find anyone who thinks things are going well, we’re going to “win” in Afghanistan or that a course correction is unneeded. (Well of course, the Obama Administration would be the other exception).
So with that backdrop, on Monday I went to hear David Kilcullen at an event hosted by the World Policy Institute here in New York. As you can likely imagine I was loaded for bear, ready to take on Kilcullen’s pro-COIN arguments.Well he started off by going through all the reasons why you don’t want to do counter-insurgency. And this wasn’t an Accidental Guerrilla argument; it was a litany of the challenges in trying to capture “hearts and minds” or fighting your way out of a COIN fight or trying to marshall political will or relying on a host country government for support or trying to “out-service provide” your enemy etc. In short, Kilcullen was basically making the basic anti-COIN argument.
So I then asked what seemed like an obvious follow-up observation: knowing all the inherent challenges in fighting a counter-insurgency – and considering the US-imposed timeline for beginning withdrawals from Afghanistan – isn’t it pretty much a terrible idea to try and wage a COIN campaign in Afghanistan today.
And Kilcullen basically said yes, arguing instead that the US should move away from COIN and focus more on stability operations. He talked about the need for a bottom-up rather than top-down strategy and the importance of devoting more resources to stable areas of Afghanistan, rather than the red zones in the south and east.
By the time he was done, I leaned over to a friend and noted that Kilcullen answered my question pretty much the exact same way I would have.
Now the fact that David Kilcullen and I agree on the hopelessness of doing COIN in Afghanistan is, in of itself, not terribly interesting. After all, if you go back to the fall Kilcullen was sounding some discordant notes about the Obama Administration trying to find some middle way to find a counter-insurgency. He seemed to be arguing that it was an all or nothing. I don’t really agree with that, because it sort of assumed COIN or nothing; but to Kilcullen’s credit he was willing to push back on the conventional wisdom.
But what is interesting, I think, is that now (in July 2010) Kilcullen seems to have basically concluded that the current mission can’t work – and that the hopes for a successful counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan have come and gone. And this is someone who just got done writing a book on counter-insurgency. (Note: The Australian COIN expert Kilkullen has been instrumental in advising the U.S. on strategy and tactics in Afghanistan, and was a major influence in writing the COIN manual, FM 3-24. Ty)Now I’m not arguing that as Kilcullen goes . . . so goes the US military or even the Obama Administration. But it seems increasingly clear that elite opinion on Afghanistan is beginning to shift against the current mission and toward a more limited set of goals. Unless Barack Obama is LBJ re-incarnated I think that has to, at some point, make a difference.
It will be interesting to see how things play out on the ground over the next few months, but I think we’ve hit a genuine inflection point on Afghan policy – and it leans toward de-escalation, not escalation.
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