Scorecard:
The Trump Administration’s National Security Policies
A Presentation and Discussion on 07 March 2019 with
Keith Hansen
NSF regular and intelligence expert
Keith Hansen, NSF regular presenter and intelligence expert with many years of experience in the U.S. Navy and Intelligence Community, gave his annual NSF presentation on the state of play of the Administration’s national security strategies and updates on U.S. nuclear arms control negotiations. NSF is very grateful for Keith’s continued engagement in these issues and willingness to share his insight, observations and concerns regularly with our group.
Keith opened with the succinct statement that no new national security strategies have been released by the Trump Administration in the last year and many of the hot-button issues (i.e., Iran, North Korea, Russia) are still vexing this Administration, as they have many Administrations before. That said, many new players are at the helm of national security strategizing for the Trump Administration since his talk last year. Kirstjen Nielsen (Secretary of Homeland Security), Rick Perry (Secretary of Energy), and Dan Coats (Director of National Intelligence) are among the few national security leaders with tenures longer than a few months. The constant change in players has contributed to conflicting positions coming from the White House on key national security issues.
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) did release the 2019 Worldwide Threat report in a briefing to Congress in late January 2019. Cyber topped the list of global threats, yet again, reflecting the continued barrage of cyber attacks from both state and non-state actors. The list of regional threats – Russian & China; North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran; Syria & Yemen; and Venezuela – remained the same as previous years with the exception of Venezuela making the short list this year. The 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment as presented by Dan Coats to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 29 Jan 2019 is available at: 2019 DNI Worldwide Threat Assessment
As for the ongoing challenges with nuclear states and nuclear “wanna-be” states, Keith started with a short summary of state-of-play on “the Iran problem.” Bottom line up front is that little progress has been made on negotiating any new agreements with Iran following President Trump’s announced withdrawal in 2017 from the “Iran Agreement”, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA). According to the U.S. and IAEA, Iran continues to remain in compliance with the terms of the JPCOA. Iran is also challenging the U.S. in other areas at every opportunity including stirring the pot in the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, continuing to sponsor terrorist groups abroad, challenging the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf, and cozying up to both Putin and Xi to counter U.S. interests around the world.
Moving on to North Korea, Keith summarized that over the last year there has been lots of talk, but little progress made towards denuclearization of North Korea. That said, negotiators from both countries continue to work through a long list of issues. Keith recommends an excellent summary of the situation presented by Stephen Biegun, U.S. Representative on North Korea, at Stanford in late January 2019 (a month before the latest Trump-Kim Summit). Previous NSF speaker, Robert Carlin, was a participant in this discussion as well. Link to Biegun remarks is: Beigun DPRK Remarks (Stanford Jan19)
Fast forward to last week, when President Trump abruptly ended the Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam with North Korean leader. Keith assured us that the sky is not falling, and the world is not ending because these talks ended without fanfare and signatures. Nuclear disarmament negotiations are long, arduous processes, often fraught with numerous setbacks. The Trump Administration is learning this lesson in real time, as many previous Administrations have done before.
Shifting to relations with Russia, Keith presciently remarked that all things regarding Russia in the Trump Administration exist under the shadow of the Mueller investigation. The finding of no evidence of collusion by Mueller may or may not help move the U.S. relationship forward. Taking advantage of both the Mueller shadow and reduced U.S. engagement abroad, Russia has gained the upper hand in the conflict in Syria and likely on other issues in the Middle East.
The bigger issues at stake vis-à-vis U.S.-Russia relations are nuclear stability and the status of nuclear arms treaties. Key to this discussion is the possible end of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the future of a New START Treaty. The precarious fate of these U.S.-Russia nuclear arms treaties presages two key questions: “Is the global nuclear non-proliferation regime at risk?” and “Are we facing a new nuclear arms race?” Decades of negotiations on strategic arms reduction with the Soviets and then Russians resulted in both countries reducing their arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons to around 1550, down from over 10,000 during the height of the Cold War. In contrast, other nuclear states possess substantially fewer warheads, ranging from around 20 attributed to North Korea to around 300-500 for China.
Keith’s professional experience as a member of the team negotiating the terms of the INF Treaty in 1980’s, allowed him to share his own insight about both the successes and setbacks during the negotiations. Driven by a desire to decouple the U.S. from its NATO allies during the height of the Cold War, the USSR threatened Europe by installing new intermediate range missiles (SS-20) on its border. In response the U.S. and NATO applied pressure on two fronts – negotiating the INF Treaty and deploying new missiles in Europe that could reach Moscow within 15 minutes (half the time it would take for an ICBM launched from the U.S. to reach its target). The latter tactic initially caused the INF negotiations to collapse, but eventually drove the Soviets back to the table and the treaty was signed in 1987. Unique among nuclear arms agreements, the INF Treaty mandated the total ban and destruction of an entire class of weapon systems with ranges from 500-5500 km. Both sides destroyed nearly 1000 weapon systems each, including all the launch and delivery infrastructure.
A major precedent-setting component of the INF Treaty was the agreement to implement on-site inspections as part of the verification and compliance regime. Trust, but verify. Implementation of this treaty was a success and the new verification terms agreed to in the INF Treaty set the stage for completion of the START I Treaty in 1991. START I reduced the number of strategic nuclear weapon systems – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers – that each side could have and expanded the on-site inspection and verification regime in the INF Treaty.
“We have had more success negotiating with the Soviets on arms control agreements during the Cold War then we are having now with Russia.”
So why abandon the INF Treaty now? The U.S. claims that Russia has developed a new nuclear cruise missile (9M729) with a range of 2000 km that violates the INF Treaty. Russia maintains that the 9M729 missile is treaty compliant and only has a range of 500 km. Tit-for-tat accusations and responses, ongoing since the Obama Administration, reached a head on February 2nd 2019 when the U.S. (followed immediately by Russia) gave notice of withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Barring a walkback from the brink by both sides within the 6 month window, the INF Treaty will lapse on 2 August 2019.
Meanwhile, it is possible that the US and Russia will attempt to negotiate a new treaty that will ban the deployment of the new Russian missile within range of NATO Europe, South Korea and Japan, as well as the deployment of new US intermediate range missiles. It seems unlikely that the Administration and Congress will agree to fund the development and deployment of any new US missile systems.
And so we sit…waiting for cooler heads to prevail…maybe. Keith reminded us that nuclear arms treaties have failed in the past, including SALT II, ABM, START II, and CTBT, and yet the U.S. and Russia continue to adhere to nearly all of the negotiated terms even if the treaties were never entered into force or were withdrawn by the U.S. or Russia. That said, anxiety about the possible collapse of INF is leading many in the arms control community to fear for the future of nuclear disarmament. In particular, Russia may be unwilling to negotiate a follow-on agreement to the START Treaty. The current New START Treaty is due to expire in 2021 and negotiations will take time. Losing both INF and START would put the U.S. and Russia in the position of having no existing nuclear arms treaties in force. Will both sides continue to abide by former agreements or are we looking at another nuclear arms race? This remains the big question looming over the global non-proliferation regime.
The implications of the end of the INF Treaty go beyond just U.S.-Russia relations to include China, India, Pakistan, and others. In the past, Russia has tried to withdraw or multi-lateralize the INF Treaty to include China, India and others. The U.S. did not bite this hook and China demurred all attempts to draw them into INF or any other nuclear arms treaty (except CTBT). A major impediment to arms reduction treaties with Russia is the push by the U.S. to continue NATO expansion on the Russian border including the deployment of missile defense systems. Russia also has significant heartburn over China’s military expansion on its other border. As for the U.S., Russian meddling in U.S. elections overshadows all discussions on these and other strategic issues. So, where do we go from here…stay tuned for more updates from Keith in the future.
“Once you have used nuclear weapons in conflict, you have lost the conflict. It’s over!”
Keith followed up his very thoughtful presentation with answers to many questions starting with a question about the possible impact of U.S. retrofitting an existing strategic warhead (W76) to be used on a SLBM, potentially making it a “useable nuke.” Keith reminded us that as technology advances, especially for targeting systems, lower yield warheads may be more suitable to hold targets at risk. That said, using nuclear weapons is something all sane war fighters want to avoid in all circumstances. Nuclear weapons are not really warfighting weapons, they are deterrent weapons. They are meant to be weapons of last resort…only to be used if/when one’s very existence is at stake. That said, Keith reminded us that maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent requires continued investments in our nuclear weapons complex to ensure the safety and reliability of the warheads that underpin deterrence.
“Get used to a nuclear-weaponed North Korea.”
Keith’s responded deftly to questions about North Korea’s real intent to denuclearize. He sees no hope of North Korea getting rid of its nuclear arsenal. The DPRK (North Korea) developed nuclear weapons explicitly because it does not trust the rest of the world. That is not likely to change anytime soon. Limiting their arsenal may be possible, but eliminating it is a bridge too far for a nation that believes it is under siege by most of the world. On the upside, Keith reminded us that nuclear disarmament negotiations take time, trust, and patience by all parties. Ongoing efforts are moving forward with North Korea and may yield result in a reduced DPRK nuclear arsenal in the future. If these negotiations are successful, Keith surmised that it was not inconceivable that the U.S. would agree to take weapons-grade plutonium from North Korea for disposal. This, he suggested with a smile, would be far preferable then receiving it delivered on the tip of a missile.
“Putin plays to the Russian soul.”
“Yes!” Keith’s succinct answer to the question, “Does Putin need to posture an antagonistic relationship with the U.S in order to stay in power?” Putin is working hard through deal-making with China and others to reestablish Russian’s rightful place in the world, and to regain its stature as the other ‘super-power’ on the global stage. As for the prospects of multi-lateral negotiations on a new INF Treaty with both Russia and China, Keith made it clear that no incentives currently exist that would lure China into any arms control negotiations. The U.S. has approached the Chinese on this topic in the past with no success. China has hundreds (not thousands) of nuclear warheads and until the U.S. and Russia take their arsenals down to that level, China’s answer to invitations to a multi-lateral negotiation dance remains a firm, “nyet!”
“The world hates us when we engage, and they hate us we don’t.”
Keith commented on the state of confusion about what role the U.S. should be playing on the world stage. Internally, the Administration appears to be grappling with the conundrum of wanting to be a force for good as the ‘world’s policeman,’ while also pushing and American First agenda. The Trump Administration is pushing hard for change in some arenas (e.g. Venezuela) at the same time it is relinquishing leadership to Russia in Syria and elsewhere. Squaring these two faces of the U.S. abroad remains confusing not only to Americans, but also to our friends and adversaries around the world.
“Bad treaties are worse than no treaties.”
Time traveling to early 2020, Keith foretold that next year’s NSF presentation would likely involve discussions about…you guessed it…Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Of the three, he remains most skeptical about Iran. Keith closed with stern words of caution about rushing treaty negotiations. Pushing too hard to reach agreements on a fixed timetable can result in weak compliance and verification regimes that undermine the fundamental purpose of the treaty and reduce the likelihood of ratification by the U.S. Senate, as was the case in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under pressure from President Clinton to reach an agreement before the 1996 elections, U.S. negotiators caved to demands from China to eliminate on-site inspections in the CTBT. This gutted the verification regime and likely led to it not being ratified by the Senate. Treaties take time and patience…and bad treaties are worse than no treaties.
With patience and high hopes for the future, we eagerly await Keith’s 2020 reprise on the Trump Administration’s national security strategies, policies, and negotiations.
Keith Hansen has extensive experience in the defense and intelligence communities, having served as a US Navy officer for 30 years and as a National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation. He also supported and served on teams negotiating the SALT II, INF, START & CTBT accords.
Keith recommends the following references for additional information:
DPRK:
“Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference”, Hanoi, Foreign Policy, 28 Feb 2019
“Trump-Kim Summit: the Art of Walking Away”, Thomas Cynkin, The National Interest, 2 Mar, 2019
Iran:
“After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy”, Mike Pompeo, The Heritage Foundation, 21 May 2018
“Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: I support Trump Wanting to Meet with Iran’s Leaders”,CNBC.com, 30 July 2018
INF Treaty:
“Mourning the INF Treaty”, Tom Nichols, Foreign Affairs Today, 4 Mar 2019
“Putin to US: I’m Ready for another Cuban Missile-style Crisis”, Andrew Osborn, Reuters, 21 Feb 2019
“Russia’s Violation of the INF Treaty”, Dept of State Fact Sheet, 4 Dec 2018
“The INF Treaty: European Perspectives on the Impending US Withdrawal”, Arms Control Today, Dec 2018