Colleagues: This “point paper” looks at the current politico-military situation in Iraq, assesses where progress has been achieved, and identifies a number of obstacles and challenges facing the Iraqis—and the U.S.—going forward. The paper concludes that the relative calm and stability we have witnessed over the past year is unlikely to continue. As American forces withdraw, simmering tensions in Iraq will likely arise, perhaps leading to a civil war. U.S. forces will be increasingly vulnerable and dependent on Iraqi security as the drawdown proceeds. While the current administration would prefer to wash its hands of Iraq and focus on other domestic and global issues, the war in Iraq will increasingly force the White House to become deeply involved. There is little chance that the future of Iraq will be as positive as the situation is now.
This paper will examine the current politico-military status in Iraq, identify issues going forward, and make predictions regarding the likely development of U.S.-Iraqi relations.
PROGRESS TO DATE:
There has been remarkable progress in Iraq over the past two years. Experts will debate which initiatives or policies led to the decline in violence and relatively harmonious political arrangements, but the undeniable fact is that the strategic and tactical situation in Iraq greatly improved between the summer of 2007 and now.
Consider the following:
- Civilian casualties: The high point was reached in May of 2007, when an estimated 3,600 civilian fatalities occurred. By May of this year that number had dropped to less than 275.
- Iraqi military and police killed: Reached a high of 300 in April of 2007, and dropped to 32 In June of this year
- US casualties: Remarkably there have been NO American combat casualties in Iraq this month; 5 were killed in July.
- Enemy-initiated attacks are now down 10-fold, from 1600 at their height to 150 per month this year
- The Iraqi police forces and the military (ISF) may have become sufficiently competent to maintain domestic order
- The Iraqi government under PM Maliki has made some effort to be a national—vis Shiite—entity. Not perfect, but has the allegiance now of most Arabs. Recent poll showed that 72% of Iraqis had confidence in their government, while only 27% had confidence in American troops.
- Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been severely defeated, although it may raise its ugly head following American troop withdrawals; the Sunni “Sons of Iraq” have been quiescent.
- In sum, as Dr. Kori Schake concludes, “the gains achieved by the counterinsurgency strategy, additional forces (Surge), and increasing capacity in Iraq’s own military and police forces are substantial”.
BUT SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS REMAIN:
Following the signing of agreements reached by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, the United States is on a steep glide path withdrawing its combat forces. Between now and August of 2010, the force of 130,000 U.S. troops is expected to shrink to no more than 50,000; the civilian contractor corps will drop from 132,000 to 75,000; of the nearly 200 bases under U.S. control, only six major hubs and a couple dozen smaller bases will remain. All American troops must be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.
It is important to note that the timetable above was concluded by then President Bush and Secretary Gates. President Obama, and ironically PM Maliki, would like to accelerate that timeline, but several groups, including the ISF, the Kurds, and some Sunni groups are resisting. For Obama, this is the “bad war”, and he wants to get rid of this “tar baby” as quickly as possible.
Unfortunately for the President, severe problems remain that could threaten the relative and fragile stability that we have witnessed (at least until the U.S. withdrawal from major cities on July 1). Despite the impressive progress, there are a number of important unresolved political, economic and military issues that must be addressed that, if no compromise is reached, threaten to lead the country back into full scale civil war.
The major issues include:
- Religious violence: The government of PM Maliki has made an effort to be a national government, but the integration of the Sunnis has been marginal. To his credit, Maliki has moved away from his Islamist Shiite sectarian political past, but he has not made much progress in integrating Sunnis into the political process. The prospect for a renewal of sectarian violence is significant—witness the deadly attacks launched by (apparently) Sunni elements against Shiite populations in the last month. Shiite restraint has been admirable but won’t continue unless the attacks cease……The Sunnis have a number of legitimate concerns: (1) Many of the 100,000 members of the Sunni Awakening Councils (those who switched from the insurgency to supporting American troops against Al-Qaeda) have not gotten the pay or jobs in the military and civil service they were promised; (2) The law permitting former Baathist party members to regain their jobs and/or pensions (mainly Sunni professional class) has not been carried out; (3) Sunni political leaders in the Parliament are regarded as ineffective or toadies of Maliki…..The resignation of the (Sunni) head of Iraqi intelligence, Mohammed al-Shahwani, a major blow to reconciliation…..The formation of the coalition of (Iranian-backed) Shiite parties in opposition to Maliki not encouraging.
- Ethnic conflicts: The Arab-Kurd split is deep and will not be easily resolved. Since the U.S. committed to protect the Kurds following the Gulf War, and now after the invasion, the Kurds of northern Iraq enjoy many of the trappings of sovereignty. Many believe that Maliki, like Saddam before him, is pursuing a strategy of “Arabnization” of the Kurdish area by encouraging emigration there, especially to disputed border cities. Kurds have internal splits but are united in their hard line in disputes with Baghdad. The Kurds have built a relatively prosperous and violence-free region, and want at least fair share of oil revenues and semi-autonomy. The problem is not just Arab-Kurd in Iraq, but involves Turkey, Iran and other countries who vehemently oppose any Kurdish sovereignty. Washington caught in the middle—wants to support Kurds but not antagonize Ankara.
- Violence in Iraq is low, but how much of that due to greatly lessened media interest and presence. Also, American casualties are down, but part of that is due to the fact that we are increasingly restricted to our bases. No casualties also reflect the fact that we operate under severe operational outcomes.
- Oil Revenues: There is still no agreement or law regarding the fair division of Iraq’s oil revenues among Sunnis (who have the least oil), the Shiites, and the Kurds. Iraq has world’s 3rd largest proven reserves. The future of Iraq lies in settling the economic questions, principally regarding oil revenue sharing.
- Iraqi Security Forces, while more professional, remain largely the preserve of Shiites, or to a lesser extent, the Kurds. Many ISF divisions remain more loyal to political parties than the government. Thus the ISF itself is less a professional, independent entity “than a core part of the larger communal struggle” (COL Reese). This politicization of the ISF remains a recipe for sectarian violence.
- Protecting American forces/contractors following a significant withdrawl. This responsibility will increasingly fall to the ISF—the question is: are they dependable? Many worry that the agreement that turned so much responsibility over to the Iraqis on July 1 has handcuffed the Americans. U.S. forces note demonstrable coolness from Iraqis now; and a growing unwillingness to accept American advice.
- Incidents between U.S. and Iraqi forces growing—Iraqis actually detained an American patrol; is armed conflict far behind? (And we are talking about only U.S. personnel—as of July there are no other nations with troops in Iraq–maybe time to change the name—the Multinational Force may have been appropriate when 40 countries contributed troops, but the U.S. now stands alone).
- Iranian presence: Two very different groups here. First, the Iranian opposition groups which have resided in Iraq under U.S. protection, but were attacked recently by government forces. Second, elements of the Tehran-backed Quds/Revolutionary Guards operating in Iraq, likely with the support of Maliki. Major worry—is the Iraqi government a closer ally of Iran than the U.S. as we go forward?
- Competence of the GoI. Lack of progress on essential services; the government of Iraq (GoI) is seen by many as incompetent and corrupt. Nepotism and cronyism rampant.
THE WAY FORWARD?
- The U.S. faces a very difficult challenge in the coming months. If it delays the withdrawl timetable to address festering problems, it will likely alienate Shiites, and some Sunnis. If it accelerates or stays on the timeline, a weak Iraq state could succumb to religious and ethnic violence, and become the center of intervention by outside powers (Iran, Turkey, Syria—even the Saudis). Under any scenario U.S. forces will be increasingly vulnerable.
- On the other hand, the positive trends of the last two years could become permanent and Iraq would solidify against external threats as the American protectorate disappears. No one expects Iraq to become a model democracy, but perhaps it could become Lebanon, some say (Wow, not much to hope for—11 distinct warring factions, and significant Hezbollah influence, but, hey, something!). Iraq will be under the sway of Iran no matter what—can we learn to live with that? A full, independent democracy is a much lower probability, but not entirely out of the question.
- In sum, while President Obama would prefer to simply rid himself of the last vestiges of the Iraq war, conditions on the ground will likely not permit that. The administration will have to conduct a withdrawl of increasingly vulnerable U.S. forces amid a firestorm of internal conflict and disarray. Leaving Iraq with our forces intact and safe, and leaving behind a relatively democratic, stable, and prosperous country will be a most difficult challenge.
–Ty
August 25, 2009