Colleagues: Recently we were very pleased to host Ambassador Tim Carney, who spoke to the current crises in northern Africa, with a focus on the inroads being made by militant Islam. Many of us had trouble “following all of the players” the Ambassador referred to. Tim has kindly forwarded his rough notes, which we greatly appreciate. Here are the core observations and comments AMB Carney made.
The Sahel and the Salafists –
Militant Islam in North Africa
By Ambassador Tim Carney
What is happening in the Sahel, the swath of African countries south of the states that line the Mediterranean Sea, defies a simple counterterrorism label. Understanding the broader story requires a grasp of nuances: the role of Sufi sects like the Tijanniya; the role in economic development/public health of Islamic civil society, and, the upswing in Islamic extremism, Taliban-style, linked to transnational groups like al-Qaeda, or to Saudi religious ultra-conservatives.
A 2010 PEW survey, Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, tells us what Muslims and Christians in 19 Nations including Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Cameroon think about themselves and about their Christian/Muslim neighbors. With little evidence of widespread anti-Muslim or anti-Christian hostility, nevertheless some 40% of Christians in 12 nations consider Muslims violent (70% in Chad); at same time 20% in most countries say their mosque or church works across religious lines to address community problems. All believe the bible or Islamic law (Shari’a) should be the basis of government. The key is that 40% or more in all countries express concern about extremist religious groups including in their own communities. AND, in all countries with at least 10% Muslim population, Muslims are more concerned about Muslim extremism than they are about Christian extremism.
Salafis are Sunni Muslims (not Shi’a). The term, Salafi, appears in the Middle Ages, and means “predecessors.” It refers to a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas, and that argued that the roots of modernity lie within Muslim civilization. They are, thus, orthodox, seeking to return to the earliest beliefs and practices of Islam. Many Salafi consider moderate Muslims infidels, and view the charismatic Sufi adherents, whose various sects are prominent throughout the region, as heretics.
Salafists divide into three broad groups: a) quietist, i.e. have nothing to do with governments; b) political, like Egypt’s An-Nour party, where it and other Salafists hold 25% of the Parliamentary seats; c) Jihadist, given to violence and action. The reality of Salafi groups is that they fragment as one individual decides he holds more truth. They are, especially the quietist and political Salafis, generally close to and get funds from the Wahhabi Saudi Salafist movement.
The current focus is on the violent, militant movement, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that has grown over the best decade, evolving from an Algerian Salafist group that the army there repressed when they seemed about to win elections. That group declared itself “united” with Al Qaeda in 2006 and changed its name to AQIM. It does not appear to take orders from a putative Al Qaeda headquarters. It calls for jihad against France, the US, Spain, They are militant in their perspective, but so far have limited operations to Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the Sahel. Membership is uncertain, believed to be in the hundreds just two years ago, but clearly much larger now. Activities include: mobile training camps, enhanced with weapons released when Qaddafi fell; funding by kidnapping and taxes on drug smuggling (cocaine) to Europe, and trafficking in persons; opposition to and possible murder of political figures; e.g. Tunisia; and a major and nearly successful effort to seize Mali early in 2013 in association with the Tuareg independence movement (MNLA) and two affiliates, the Ansar Dine, run by a Tuareg tribesman active in rebellion in the 90s, and by MOJWA, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. MOJWA, an African splinter from AQIM, illustrates AQIM;s major weakness, unwillingness/inability to develop black African leadership, limiting penetration deeper into sub-Saharan Africa.
Three issues grip Mali, our case study: the MNLA resumed fighting for independence; AQIM joined them, then marginalized the MNLA, beginning to rule harshly in areas seized from the government; the Mali government itself, inept and corrupt, suffered a military coup in March 2012 by unhappy army leaders. The regional West African group, ECOWAS, was too slow using its UN mandate to protect Mali, and France, assisted by U.S. airlift and intelligence, sent 4,000 troops, aided by 2,200 troops from Chad, and chased AQIM and affiliates into the Ifoghas Mountains, but have not yet defeated them and are unlikely to do so in any near future. The MNLA is now cooperating with the French as long as Mali government forces are not brought into their area. Some 6,300 troops from other African states have joined a UN-sanctioned support mission for Mali, MISMA in the French acronym, which the Chad troops recently joined, too. Pending is a UN effort to turn the effort into a UN Charter Chapter 7 force with the Africa Union, to defeat AQIM and help build military competence and governance in Mali. Elections to create a legitimate government in Mali are tentatively set for July.
US Policy, according to the 2010 National Security Strategy is to “…disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates…part of a multinational effort” through a strategy that: denies them safe haven; strengthens our front-line partners; secures our homeland; pursues justice through durable legal approaches. Serious efforts began with a State Dept. 2002 Pan-Sahel initiative to increase border security and military and counterterrorism capacity in Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania. That evolved in June 2005 to the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a counterterrorism and military training program with development assistance and public diplomacy dimensions, also under State, that included Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. It had major five-year funding. Special Forces engaged in training. After its creation, the Africa Combatant Command (AFRICOM) took over from CENTCOM in 2008 and works to increase intelligence, command & control, logistics, border control, and conducts joint exercises. As required by US law, coups (Mauritania and Mali last year) ended American military and development funding, permitting only humanitarian assistance. US lawyers found an adequate formula to permit U.S. airlift support for French troops and to create a base in Niger for unarmed drones to provide intelligence support to the effort against AQIM in Mali.
For the future, the US and Europe seem to grasp that they cannot succeed in countering Islamic extremism with just drones, military/police training and military ops. The key is a fuller understanding of Islamist movements in all their nuance and complexity; esp. why extremism attracts dispossessed. The vital component in all countries is governance, with weak and coup-ridden entities the most vulnerable to extremist actions/appeal. The U.S. role is one of support. Our most vital interests are the stability of the countries concerned and their near neighbors. However, residual Western interests are primarily European and relate to Sahel energy and mineral resources and to efforts to combat criminal activity aimed at Europe.
Tim Carney is a retired American diplomat with over 40 years experience in conflict areas, beginning with Viet Nam during the Tet offensive, and later in the Sudan, Somalia, South Africa, and Iraq (twice), Cambodia and Afghanistan. Carney was our last Ambassador to the Sudan, and later served in Haiti, also as our Ambassador. Carney has also served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and as a Director on the NSC staff.