Colleagues: Two posts today, dealing first with our options with respect to Iran, and secondly, an insightful commentary on the situation in Syria.
My article in yesterday’s RGJ argues that while Iran and the Iranian nuclear weapons program are anathema to us and do not bode well for future events in the Mid-East, we–and Israel–realistically have few options. The “military strike” to take out the Iranian program does not stand up to scrutiny.
I asked Dr. John Jandali, himself a Syrian-born Sunni, to comment on the events in Syria and the likely direction the revolution will take. Some of you may have seen John’s comments, but I wanted to make them available to a wider audience. Very insightful and worth a close read. Ty
Reno Gazette-Journal
Nov. 22, 2011
ONE VIEW Tyrus W. Cobb
Iran will get the bomb, so what do we do now?
Recent intelligence estimates indicate that Iran will soon have the technology and materials to build a nuclear bomb. It has been developing the various key components, including neutron initiators and complex explosives needed to build a warhead small enough to place on top of a ballistic missile.
Tehran has steadily increased its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which could be further refined to weapons grade.
Most observers believe that an Iran with nuclear weapons would represent a major security challenge to Israel, the United States and many Mideast countries. A nuclear Iran could be the catalyst for additional proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and beyond.
Would Iran’s rivals for regional dominance — such as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia — seek their own nuclear weapons to counterbalance Tehran?
For years, the U.S. and its allies have relied on a combination of sanctions and isolation to thwart Iranian ambitions. To no avail, and the closer Iran gets to acquiring nuclear weapons, the fewer options that will be available to stop its progress.
Imposing more stringent sanctions is unlikely. China and Russia will certainly veto any significant acceleration of economic and diplomatic penalties.
In light of this, the option of a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear weapons complex is being discussed more seriously. Indeed, Israel’s recent test launch of a long-range missile and Prime Minister Netanyahu’s assertions that Iran’s nuclear program posed “a direct and heavy threat” only increased such speculation.
The U.S. and Israel have correctly refused to take the “military option” off the table in responding to the Iranian challenge.
For Israel, these recent developments have likely lead it to believe that it has only a short period in which it could launch a nuclear attack that would devastate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
The problem with a military strike is that the downsides are great. A “surgical strike” would likely be ineffective against Iran’s multi-layered and entrenched facilities. Its infrastructure is robust, well-protected, redundant and often underground.
Many sites are located close to heavily populated areas. Even a massive air operation would likely only halt the program for a few months. Further, any strike would likely drive the restless populace into the arms of the hardliners and enhance the unpopular regime’s status.
In response, Tehran might seek to close the Straits of Hormuz, through which much of the world’s oil passes. This would lead to a sharp rise in the price of oil, as much as $250 a barrel, and the damage to the global economy would be great. Most likely Iran would also launch retaliatory missile attacks against Israel and unleash its proxies in Gaza (Hamas) and Lebanon (Hezbollah).
No one likes the prospect of having to accommodate to the reality of a nuclear-armed Iran, but it is unlikely that any effort to punish Iran would be very effective. While we should employ extensive economic sanctions and covert programs (such as cyber-intrusion), an Iranian nuclear capability may not be preventable.
But adopting a policy of preventive war because all other options appear ineffective would be reckless.
Tyrus W. Cobb of Reno served as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan for national security affairs 1983-89.
////////////
A question I posed to Dr. Jandali: John, more reports on the growing violence in your home country of Syria. Many questions–any chance the Alawite/Baathist regime can be overthrown? If so, what does that mean for Iran? Israel? (doubtful a Sunni government would be any more disposed toward Israel), the US? Any recommendations what the US ought to do? Ty
Ty,
Two critical factors could impact the future of the Alawite/Baathist regime in Syria, one is internal and the other external. And the two forces are not mutually exclusive, and, if combined, could facilitate the overthrow of the regime.
The first factor is already unfolding, and it relates to the defections of military personnel and their joining the “Liberation Army”, fighting the regime. We need to keep in mind that even though the Assad/Alawite elite has filled the top leadership positions in the armed forces with Alawite officers, the rank and file soldiers had to be recruited from the Sunni majority sect in the country. My sources in Syria tell me that more and more of those soldiers are defecting, almost daily, as they witness the regime issuing orders to butcher their own people and destroy their cities and villages.
However, As of today, the regime is still able to maintain control of the armed forces and continue its oppressive response to the opposition. But, in spite of that, I would not rule out the possibility of a “bloodless coup d’état”, which could alter the balance of power, open genuine negotiations with the opposition groups, and reach accommodation, leading to some type of representative and inclusive government power sharing. Such a coup could be structured by an ambitious Alawite officer, or group of officers, who aspire to grab power and put an end to the Assad Dynasty.
The second factor relates to policies and actions of outside powers and their impact on the outcome of this continuing crisis. Clearly, the US and other European allies have no appetite for a Libyan type military action in Syria. Instead, they opted to apply some economic and financial sanctions and pursued diplomatic pressures designed to weaken and isolate the regime. Most of these measures have not been successful in altering the government’s brutal crackdown and killing of civilians. The Arab League has also tried to convince the Assad regime to modify its behavior and open negotiations with the opposition groups, and when these efforts were ignored the Leagues expelled Syria from membership .
Turkey, more than any other outside power, has had significant influence on the political and military developments surrounding the Syrian revolution. From the very beginning of this crisis, Turkey has strongly condemned the use of force against innocent civilians, and has exhausted all diplomatic efforts at pushing the Assad Regime to change course and reach a peaceful solution to the problems at hand. And when these efforts failed, Turkey opened its doors to members of the opposition movement seeking refuge away from the pursuit of the killing machines, and erected camps for thousands of Syrian dissidents, and allowed the opposition leaders to plan and organize on Turkish soil. The Turkish government has given up on the Assad regime, and has openly called for Bashar Al Assad to step down. And, with the increased defection of elements of the Syrian armed forces, the opposition movement becomes more and more “militarized” and in need of military and logistical assistance, Turkey seems to be the logical avenue for such aid to flow in. Some sources indicate that Saudi Arabia has already begun, with Turkish cooperation, to provide the Army of Liberation with military and logistical assistance. If this continues, it could have significant ramifications on the nature of the conflict, and will most likely widen the scope of the military confrontation, and could lead to a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Alawites.
Many Arab observers suggest that time is running out on the Assad regime, and that with the increased deterioration of the economy and dissatisfaction of the merchant class in the major cities, the opposition movement is likely to grow in number and force as to eventually affect a change in the direction of the country.
What will happen after the Assad regime collapses is anyone’s guess. The opposition groups lack cohesion and unity, and include a mix of political , ideological, and religious tendencies The role of the military in a post Assad regime remains another big question. And, certainly Egypt’s recent events do not provide a workable model for the Syrians to emulate.
Finally, a comment or two regarding Iran and Israel. Iran will be reluctant to get involved in any internal change of government, realizing that doing so would threaten a much wider regional confrontation that may involve other major players. And there is no reason to suggest that Syria’s delicate relations with Israel would undergo any change, regardless of the change in government style. With the superior military power of Israel, and especially its superior air power, it would be foolish for the Syrians to contemplate any adventure that may lead to confrontation with Israel.