Colleagues:
I was able to obtain this highly classified White House document dated March 7. In it Tom Donilon, the National Security Advisor, lays out the situation in Libya and provides the President with three options (and the pros and cons of each). You will find it interesting! (See my comments at the end). Ty
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TOP SECRETO—RUMINT
Memorandum For: THE PRESIDENT
Through: Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor
From: B. Shagnasty, NSC Politico-Military Staff
Subject: The Situation in Libya and Your Options
BACKGROUND: The situation in Libya is growing more serious by the day. The rebels, largely based in eastern Libya, have seized control of several major cities and are moving toward Tripoli. The Director of National Intelligence, however, believes that once Muammar Qaddafi commits his powerful armed forces and police, the rebels will be quickly defeated. Thus unless the United States, either alone or in concert with conservative Arab nations and/or NATO, intervenes with decisive force, key cities such as Benghazi will be retaken and its citizens subjected to a brutal onslaught.
You directed the NSC staff to prepare a list of options for you to consider with respect to the Libyan crisis. This paper provides three alternatives and weighs the pros and cons of each option. This memorandum also indicates which agencies or individuals’ support which alternative.
You will also have to consider cancelling your trip to South America. Given the importance we accord to emerging democracies/economic powers you will visit, including Chile, Argentina, and especially Brazil, no Agency/individual recommends you cancel the trip. Further, should you postpone these state visits, it will accord unnecessary importance to a conflict that in itself is not a vital US interest.
The options laid out below include: (1) Doing nothing; (2) Imposing a No Fly Zone in concert with at least your NATO allies; (3) Full scale armed intervention on behalf of the rebels. Here are the options and your staff’s evaluation of each:
1. CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SITUATION, BUT DO NOT INTERVENE.
We are very uncertain about the rebel forces—who they are, what their goals and aspirations are, whether or not a common leadership exists, and their military capabilities. While there are humanitarian concerns, we do not believe that the Libyan crisis is a vital national interest but that intervention would carry significant risk. Advocates of this position do not believe that there is any surgical military option, such as a No Fly Zone, which would not lead to deeper involvement. The United States is also already engaged in two wars in the Middle East, there are protests and uprisings in several other Arab countries that we must be concerned with, and there is reason to believe that eastern Libya (where the rebels emanate) is a hot bed of Islamic radicalism. Any intervention will be costly and could easily exceed $1 billion.
This option is favored by the following agencies/individuals (redacted but favored by many in the Defense establishment and seasoned Mid-East experts).
2. IMPOSE A NO FLY ZONE, IN CONCERT WITH OUR NATO ALLIES.
Your defense advisors have said we can impose a No Fly Zone fairly quickly and effectively. This would involve first striking and taking out Libyan air defense assets. While ostensibly limited in scope, an NFZ would in reality be a part of larger suppression action designed to neutralize much of Qaddafi’s forces. We believe it would be best for the US not to conduct such an action unilaterally but with the endorsement of the UN, our Arab friends, and NATO. This will not be easy – most likely China and Russia, or even (non-permanent member) Brazil would veto the resolution. It will also be difficult to secure the approval of the Arab league or other nations in the Mid East. You may be able to secure NATO approval, but getting key European allies in the fray and to lead the military strikes will not be easy. If you do impose the NFZ you should be aware that it will be certainly a US unilateral action initially.
Any military intervention will raise the question of Congressional approval. We strongly recommend that if you choose to intervene, you do not initially seek Congressional approval for launching military action in accordance with the War Powers Resolution. There will be plenty of squawking from the Hill, but frankly most members would not welcome having to face this choice.
This option is favored by the following Agencies/individuals (redacted but strongly favored by your political advisors who believe the failure to protect Benghazi citizens from a massacre similar to Srebrenica could result in you being labeled as weak and indecisive. Certain pundits will recall that our intervention in the Kosovo crisis caused the Serbs to retreat. In fact, this is not true – while air power was instrumental, Russian withdrawl of support for Belgrade was more important.) Your Secretary of State, and interestingly, several key female policy makers strongly support this option.
3. FULL-SCALE INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE REBELS.
There is no doubt that Qaddafi is a megalomaniacal, ruthless dictator who will, without any qualms, commit genocide on his own citizens. In the past he has been a key player in supporting international terrorism, Jihadists who came to Iraq to fight the US, and insurgent anti-US movements. However, your advisors point out, in response to strong US pressure in the last decade he has muted that support, given up his nuclear weapons, and focused internally. Within your Administration there is a debate about whether US interests would be better served by his removal or allowing him to remain in power as a weakened autocrat.
We have no reason to believe that, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the rebels here are motivated by democratic aspirations. Instead, they are conservative, strong Islamists, and with loyalty primarily to their own tribes. Removing Qaddafi would likely require deep US intervention, including ground forces to bring some semblance of stability to this important oil exporting nation. Given Libya’s lack of institutions, its tribal structure, and its small middle class, some form of international peace keeping force would be necessary. Your advisors are concerned that the only well organized force in this region are radical Islamists groups who will be poised to take advantage of the chaos of transition.
This option (redacted) is not favored by any of your advisors. There will be many pundits proclaiming the necessity of removing Qaddafi and how simple it would be. In addition, they will paint a rosy picture of a post-Qaddafi Libya that would be a democratic beacon in this troubled region.
In sum, Mr. President, regardless of the choice you make, we recommend that you deliver an address to the nation about the Libyan crisis. This should occur after you return from South America so as not to accord more importance to this situation than is warranted.
The primary focus of that speech should be to more specifically spell out what our ultimate objectives are with respect to Libya. We recommend that this not be an address from the Oval Office, but from a suitable military-oriented setting. At that point, staff will prepare remarks that will in part be designed to disabuse anyone of the easiness of implementing any option. This should be augmented by media availability for figures such as SecState and SecDef.
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Of course, this is not an actual memo. However, I do believe that it probably simulates fairly accurately a Presidential Decision Memo that would have been submitted to the President some three weeks ago. I have prepared this memo in order to illustrate the complexities of the choices involved, the numerous factors the President must consider, the political ramifications of each alternative, the costs involved, the role of Congress, and trying to decide what is the Libya we would most want to emerge from this crisis.
I hope it provides some fodder for thought as you listen to the President’s address to the nation tonight.
–Ty