Israel and the Syrian War
By Rexford Barton
Overview:
Israel has been formally neutral in the Syrian civil war, despite early calls for Assad to be removed. Israel has claimed (open source) that it has not provided any group with arms or material support; however, they have treated upwards of 1,600 wounded rebels (regardless of affiliation) when they sought help from Israel’s border posts. Israel has also carried out several air strikes within Syria throughout the war- primarily against Hizballah or arms transfers to Hizballah.
As recently as November 3rd, Israel’s defense minister, Moshe Yaalon, said Israel is no longer taking a public position on Assad’s prospects of staying in power- citing the Russian and U.S. differences on the issue. That is just az commentary on the prospects of his staying in power, not Israel’s desired outcome of Assad’s removal.
This may come as a surprise given Daesh’s virulent anti-Semitism, but ISIS does not pose an immediate strategic threat to Israel. Despite the ISIS presence in the Sinai peninsula and the threat it has posed to its neighbor, Jordan, Israel still views the Iranian axis as its most immediate strategic threat; with the Iranian nuclear deal viewed as exacerbating this threat by giving Iran a “boost” in the region.
Syria:
In the long term, Israel’s desire is to remove Syria from Iran’s orbit, breaking the “Shia crescent,” which would deliver a blow to Iran’s standing in the region as well has add an obstacle in its resupply of Hizballah in Lebanon. Israel views the removal of Assad as a means to accomplishing this goal.
However, regime change would not necessary remove Syria as a threat to Israel. There is great consternation over the removal of Assad as the Sunni groups of Syria, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, who would likely replace the Assad regime, are by no means friendly to Israel.
Lebanon/Hizballah:
With Hizballah fighting in Syria to defend Assad, the group currently cannot mount a major operation against Israel, but arms- namely rockets with some anti-ship ballistic missiles and potentially more advanced MANPADs- are still being transferred to Hizballah through Syria. As stated earlier, Israel will take action against these transfers as well as traditional Hizballah targets of opportunity.
With the deployment of significant Russian anti-air defense systems, Israel may find its ability to carry out further strikes dependent upon Russian acquiescence. So far, Israel and Russia have been able to work together.
Golan Heights and the Druze:
On the Syrian side of the Golan, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are the two largest/strongest groups.
The Druze and the Golan Heights provides Israel with its direct domestic challenge in regards to the Syrian crisis. After the 1967 war and Israel’s occupation of part of the Golan, the border now separates many families and tribes. On one hand, most of the Druze have historically maintained loyalty to Syria. However they have also called upon Israel to help protect their brethren on the Syrian side. An attack against an IDF ambulance carrying an Arab rebel in June has been attributed to a group of Druze who were retaliating against a massacre in one of the Druze villages in Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra claimed responsibility AND apologized for the massacre (sincere apology or did Israel send a message?).
Israel has held meetings with the Druze leadership on the issue and considers attacks against the Druze to be one of its red lines.
What may prove to be the most significant outcome to Israel in this war is the effect it has had on the residents of the Golan in Israel, who may now wish to remain with Israel despite their historic loyalty to Syria (mostly the younger generation).
Jordan:
In Israel’s view. the only real game changer toward the crisis and ISIS would be an ISIS invasion of its eastern neighbor. If Jordan is destabilized by ISIS or the Syrian civil war, Israel will feel more pressure to act to reinforce the Hashemite regime.
Conclusion:
In the short term, despite al-Qaeda’s and ISIS’s growth in the Golan and Sinai, Israel’s security is benefitted by the civil war in Syria. Hizballah is occupied in Syria, Assad’s forces are occupied fighting the rebels, and Sunni Islamist groups are fighting Assad and Hizballah. For now, Israel’s enemies are fighting each other.
However, that is not a long-term solution and Israel has maintained its view of the “Iranian axis” as the primary strategic threat and the removal of Assad as a blow against that threat. However, the replacement of Assad could prove to be just as much of a threat as Assad is!
Therefore, the specifically desired outcome for Israel is:
- Syria to move out of Iran’s orbit
- The removal of Assad
- Replacement with a Syrian-Nationalist Secular government
An interesting question may be:
If Assad stayed, but moved Syria away from Iran and discontinued its support for Hizballah, how would Israel then view the removal of Assad?
All part of the increasingly chaotic and confusing Middle East!
Rex Barton served in both Iraq and Afghanistan as an intelligence analyst with the Nevada Air National Guard. He recently completed a Masters Degree in Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University in Israel. This is a summary of his remarks to the NSF on our program on the challenges from radical movements in the Middle East.