Needed Now–A Different US Course with ISIS By Stephen R. Metcalf

Needed Now–A Different US Course with ISIS

• By Stephen R. Metcalf

A number of significant factors in Syria and Iraq have brought the U.S. and Europe to a critical decision juncture and the necessity to do a reassessment of their roles in Mid East stability:

• The strengthening of ISIS in recruits and governance,
• The failure of the Iraqi government to take the extraordinary steps necessary to assure the future sharing of governance with its minority Sunni population,
• The unwillingness of regional states to mobilize ground forces to confront ISIS,
• The mass migration of refugees from the region to European and other countries,
• The weakening of Syria’s Assad government and the buildup of Russian military forces in Syria to assure an influence in a post-Assad government.

The repeated failure of Western intervention

The US experience of the past several years has demonstrated what courses of action don’t work. The challenge now for the Obama Administration is to choose a course that will work in light of that experience.

First, when the populations of nations are generally dissatisfied with their governments they are more willing to support a rebellion, civil war or revolution. More than any other factor, the Arab Spring has been a response to failed governance in several authoritarian states. Technology has permitted populations to readily see the disparity between their economic situations and those of the developed world.

Second, incursions by Western nations in Iraq and Libya resulted in the proliferation of weapons across the Mid East and Africa and has fueled the growth of violent jihadist bands that have capitalized on broad public dissatisfaction. The Shia-Sunni divide, with Iran on one end and Saudi Arabia on the other, has further destabilized the region with proxy conflicts. Additionally, US policy makers completely missed the intentions of the Maliki government in Iraq as it subtly pushed US forces out, then systematically attempted to restructure itself as a Shia state. The result is a Mid East in turmoil with four failed states:  Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria.

The fact that the nations of the Mid East, less Israel, are non-secular Muslim states, has further added to their destabilization. The Old Testament of the Bible, embraced by Jews, Christians and Muslims, was ostensibly an historic record. The Quran (and its associated Hadiths), on the other hand, is instructional in nature. While parts of it teach tolerance, kindness and peace, other parts teach intolerance, violence and human abuse wildly at odds with 21st Century civilization. That makes it far easier for one violent jihadist leader after another to pop up and recruit angry or frustrated Muslims to follow strict interpretations of the Quran, thinking they are serving Allah in a holy war against whomever the leaders designate as infidels.

Over the past several years the U.S. has naively felt it could eliminate the bad apples, which would lead to a more stable and democratic region. However, while Westerners think of their nations as secular, the Muslim populations of the Mid East predominately consider Western nations Christian. Many Muslims are, therefore, receptive to anti-Western propaganda and violently react to incursions from the West. Most Westerners would correctly anticipate the hostile reaction of Muslims to any invasion by Israeli ground forces. What they have failed to realize is the similar Muslim reaction to invasions by Western ground forces. While authoritarian governments in the Mid East selectively have welcomed Western military involvement, significant portions of their populations have not. Instead such involvement has provided a huge propaganda boost to violent jihadist recruiting.

Does the ongoing instability and success by radical Islamists require US/Western intervention?

With the continued strengthening of ISIS and the mass migration of refugees to Europe, U.S. interventionists are increasingly beating the drum for the deployment of US ground forces to fight ISIS. However, their focus on short term objectives repeats the errors of the past and fails to connect the dots to an achievable, long term, stable end state.

Whether to fight Shia governments, Sunni governments, ISIS or al Qaeda entities, what business does the US have entering yet another intra-Muslim conflict? Why has every government and every senior cleric across the Muslim World not publicly denounced ISIS and it’s vile deeds? Why have Muslim governments across the Mid East not mobilized their populations to face the ISIS threat? Could it be that these authoritarian governments fear their populations would not answer their call? Why should Western nations enter the fight in their stead; particularly since greater Western involvement only accelerates the recruiting success of all violent jihadist entities?

The whack-a-mole metaphor in referring to one wanna-be caliph or violent jihadist leader after another is not a cliche. If it is so foolish – if it so ignores the lessons of history – America will bankrupt itself engaging in one elective Muslim conflict after another.

Since a strict reading of parts of the Quran legitimizes violent jihad, it would be necessary for Muslim governments and Muslim scholars across the world to embark on a reformation that reinforces Islam as a religion of peace and tolerance and categorically rejects violence to propagate the faith before long term regional peace and stability could be reached. Such a reformation would make all violent jihadists enemies of the state and of Islam and would severely limit their ability to recruit followers, as it would break the link between violent jihad and service to Allah.

If the states in the region themselves are not willing to step up and shoulder the burden in contesting the radicals, can/should the U.S./West jump in? Before answering that, consider the costs of past involvement: In 2013 a team at Brown University conservatively estimated the long term cost to the U.S. of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars at $4.5 trillion (http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/). That number is still growing and every dollar of it so far has been deficit spending to be paid by today’s young citizens over the next 30 years. Those wars cost 4,800+ American lives, tens of thousands of Americans maimed, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi and Afghanistan non-combatants killed or maimed and millions of refugees… and what has been achieved? At some point and with little warning the global markets are going to stop funding the U.S. deficit to accommodate our elective foreign military adventures.

Almost immediately the Shia leader of Iraq began to squander the West’s huge investment to form a Shia state at the exclusion of the Sunnis and Kurds. Afghanistan has turned into a welfare state on the U.S. dole that is happy to extend its reliance on us as long as possible. The best intelligence estimates of the Taliban’s size is 20,000 to 30,000; yet, Afghanistan, a warrior nation, has a population of 30 million. When a population cannot win a fight with a 1000 to 1 advantage, it is because it lacks the will.

Here is the key question I pose to our readers: Does it make sense to engage in an intra-Muslim conflict for which Muslims nations, themselves, are not willing to mobilize and in which there is not an imminent threat to the United States? Perhaps the Obama Administration should review the nation’s balance sheet and the lessons of the past, then guide the West toward a supporting role that includes selling weapons, assisting with training at several levels and providing technical intelligence. A downside would be the need to rely on Muslim governments and Israel for human intelligence.

Policy recommendations:

First, with respect to Syria, the U.S. should aggressively seek a diplomatic solution in Syria that rebinds the population not affiliated with al Qaeda or ISIS. While President Putin is increasing Russian forces in Syria to maintain Russian bases and to prevent a collapse of the Assad regime, he cannot afford a protracted conflict and would very likely be willing to have Syrian presidential elections in 18 months, overseen by the UN, at which time Assad would exit. That would permit time for the binding of wounds, the strengthening of political parties and the selection of candidates. An agreement for long term basing rights would further entice Russia to facilitate Assad’s exit. Such an agreement would begin to unify a force against ISIS and al Qaeda.

Should Russia continue to say one thing and do another, while continuing to strike non-jihadist Syrian rebels, the U.S. should sell a limited number of MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems) to a Saudi Arabia or the UAE for use by a trusted rebel force against Russian aircraft. This would have the added advantage of testing the current generation U.S. systems against Russia’s fighters.

The U.S. should strongly encourage the Gulf States and Egypt to use their substantial tactical air power to increase airstrikes as the U.S. shifts back toward protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq. The continuation of U.S. assistance to the Iraqi government should be contingent on a formal, comprehensive and proportionate sharing of power with the Iraqi Sunnis. The ultimate fight to defeat ISIS and al Qaeda elements in Syria and Iraq should be the responsibility of Syria, Iraq and the other threatened regional states.

Europe and the U.S. should welcome war migrants on a controlled basis and offer visas of indefinite alien status until they can return to their home countries. A provision of the visas should clearly state that they can be revoked through the court system, if the aliens participate in any fundamentalist activities in contravention of the laws and regulations of the host countries. Of course, the host countries could selectively offer full citizenship as they saw fit.

Though there are growing calls for an escalation of military force in Syria and Iraq by some U.S. personnel in leadership and advisor positions (whose motives may also be muddled with power, promotion, profit or partisanship), the Obama Administration needs to step away from one more failed, hugely expensive Mid East conflict and chart a course for the U.S. and its Western allies that encourages Muslims to deal with Muslims. Hopefully, that will lead to a reduction in the continuous emergence of violent jihadists and permit the region a level of long term stability Western intervention has not, and will not, be able to achieve.

• Steve Metcalf is a West Point graduate, a former infantry commander in combat and a lifelong student of foreign policy. He resides in Reno.