General David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon recently wrote an op-ed advocating that “the right approach for the United States is not to pull out next year but to keep several bases and several thousand U.S. and other NATO-coalition troops in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future”. They argue that the costs– perhaps $7-13 billion a year and many U.S. casualties– is a worthwhile investment that would deter another major terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland. Below, USAF Special Ops veteran Michael Haas argues to the contrary.
An Uncharacteristic Gaffe
By COL Michael Haas (USAF-Ret)
The usually astute General David Petraeus and his colleague Michael O’Hanlon are making an uncharacteristic gaffe in their urging President Obama to rescind the scheduled withdrawal of all American operational combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of next year (“The U.S. needs to keep troops in Afghanistan,” Washington Post op-ed, July 7).
The case put forth by Messrs. Petraeus and O’Hanlon suffers on a number of fronts, from their arguable misreading of recent history to speculating on hypothetical events in Afghanistan’s future. More troubling still are the authors’ negation by exclusion of the extent to which Islamic terrorism has morphed in ways unimaginable since Task Force Dagger sent U.S. Special Operations and CIA paramilitary teams into Afghanistan a long fourteen years ago.
The authors’ advocacy for prolonging US involvement in Afghanistan post-2016 appears based on three central tenets: First, the plausible risk that a resurgent Taliban will again welcome Al Qaeda (AQ) back into the country. Second, the Afghan political class and general public “overwhelmingly want us to stay.” And third, America’s financial and blood investments to date have been for a cause well worth still more of the same in a future Afghanistan. Let’s take these assertions one at a time before considering this author’s counter-perspective on the Petraeus/O’Hanlon viewpoint.
As to the speculation that AQ may someday return to Afghanistan, this Special Operations veteran and historian responds, “Probably not and even if they do, so what?” My impudence warrants explanation.
It’s worth remembering that AQ grew out of the ashes of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, propelled largely by two forces: One was a wealthy, radicalized Saudi prince, the other a regional hostility to AQ that would not allow these terrorists to openly operate anywhere else but Afghanistan.
For the last four years that wealthy prince has been lying at “an undisclosed location” somewhere on the bottom of the Indian Ocean. And not only AQ but its derivative, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), now enjoy strongholds in oil-rich regions immeasurably better-placed than Afghanistan for its attacks on Middle Eastern, North African, and Western foes. Succinctly put, the hypothetical threat emanating from a much-diminished AQ returning to isolated Afghanistan, will pale in comparison to the Islamic terrorism the West is already failing to stop in many more important countries. (Pakistan’s leaders may not share this view!)
As for the authors’ assertion that the majority of Afghan citizens still want the US to stay in their country, it’s hardly a wonder why. The decade-plus presence of American security forces and financial largesse has brought once-unimaginable fortunes to Afghanistan’s corrupt political elites.
And it’s also masked a very indiscrete question: How is it that a nation of some thirty million people cannot effectively cope with a Taliban insurgency estimated at a mere thirty thousand fighters? Even for we “math disadvantaged” souls that appears to be 1,000 citizens facing each insurgent. Who wouldn’t want the world’s richest, most generous country to come fight the local trouble-makers on behalf of the sidelined majority population?
On Messrs. Petraeus and O’Hanlon’s last point, staying to “protect our investment’” (2,000 American KIA, untold numbers permanently maimed, one trillion US taxpayer dollars), this author turns to the shrewd philosophy sung by an American not generally credited as a foreign policy expert:
You’ve got to know when to hold ’em, Know when to fold ’em
Know when to walk away . . . And when to run
—Kenny Rogers
The fundamental point offered in this counter-view is that the Islamic terrorism envisioned by Osama bin Laden nearly two decades ago has since morphed into something beyond even that madman’s hopes. With ISIS firmly at the helm of global terrorism and expanding steadily against an irresolute West, Afghanistan’s priority has slipped badly in the big scheme of things. When Gen. Petraeus and Mr. O’Hanlon assert an American withdrawal from Afghanistan next year “would be playing roulette with Afghanistan’s future”, this writer wonders in turn, “Why not let the Afghans take responsibility for playing their own roulette wheel?”
As jarring as it sounds to the national security mindset, the country where it all began—at least from the American experience—has now come to represent the same liability to both the West and ISIS: Afghanistan is in 2015 a backwater theater to which neither side can afford to divert serious resources.
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Col. Michael Haas, USAF, ret.
During his joint Army-Air Force career the author served in a number of Special Operations, Air Staff, and Defense Intelligence Agency assignments.