War Narratives:
Shaping beliefs, blurring truths in the Middle East
A Presentation and Discussion on 02 July 2019 with
Caleb Cage
Iraq War veteran and local author
“Multiple narratives from different perspectives, even different narratives with competing agendas, are invaluable with regard to finding the truth about what happened in the past.”
(Gary Cage in the Foreword to War Narratives)
It is a rare opportunity that one gets to explore war from the perspective of a veteran, writer, philosopher, and thought leader in the community. The National Security Forum was afforded that unique opportunity when Caleb Cage came to talk. During his presentation we were able to look at pivotal events in the Iraq War through Caleb’s eyes and see, not only the unfolding of events, but also to journey through his experience connecting on-the-ground realities with the narratives about the war that continue to shape public opinion.
“Narratives, therefore, are historical tapestries, and as such, they are works of art…The creator of the narrative selects those events, and aspects of events, that give the greatest force to the basic premise of the story.”
(Gary Cage in the Foreword to War Narratives)
Narratives are not just the domain of storytellers and journalists. They can be formidable tools used by politicians, leaders, and the media to promote a particular interpretation of events or to sway public opinion. This is not a new art form. Narratives are how we as humans have throughout time relayed our own experiences to others and connected to the socio-cultural and political issues of our time. Setting the stage for Caleb’s presentation, Dr. Gary Cage (Professor of Philosophy and father to Caleb), opened with some insight into the role narratives play in both recording and shaping history. He reminded us that “in fact, there is no meaning without narrative.” We use narratives to tell our life stories. Narratives form a bridge between facts and interpretation. Citing Lydia Goehr, Gary provided context for Caleb’s remarks with the quote, “Facts without interpretation are plain, but interpretation without facts is fiction.”
“People hold well-informed beliefs about these wars [Iraq and Afghanistan] that differ from others, who also hold well-informed beliefs.”
(Caleb Cage in “War Narratives,” Texas A&M University Military History Series No. 163)
Caleb picked up the mantle in his opening remarks, outlining the basic problems with narratives about the Iraq War. Narratives about the war are based on one’s beliefs and those beliefs determine which “facts” get included in the story that is told. They intrinsically align with deeply held worldviews, confirming one’s social, political and cultural perspectives. During the Iraq War narratives quickly snowballed into the mainstream consciousness due in large part to the 24/7 multimedia landscape that witnessed the conflict and the fact that the military force was all-volunteer. The latter created a civil-military divide that separated those that fought from those that only experienced the war on CNN. Political leaders, on both sides used the slim number of Americans with actual experience and knowledge of the war in Iraq to weave stories that suited their political objectives.
Caleb highlighted a few key narratives that he believes have shaped most people’s perception of the war. These narratives continue to shape public opinion about the war’s purpose and what it means for the U.S. looking forward. He started with the “War of Choice” and “Cowboy” narratives. In these stories President George W. Bush was willing to “go it alone” and “engage in total war no matter the costs.” These narratives were promoted by the President himself in his oft quoted remarks, “Wanted Dead or Alive” and “the full force of the United States will hunt you down and exact justice.” Although this rhetoric was very effective in sparking a sense of patriotism and Western fighting spirit at home, it did not reflect the reality of the prosecution of the war. George Bush did not, in fact, take the country into war on his own, he was supported by many in his Administration, Congress and U.S. allies abroad. He had the tacit support of Congress who opted to abdicate their war powers responsibility and allowed the war to proceed under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed in 2001 for the war in Afghanistan. This allowed the President to engage in a new war in Iraq without needing to present to Congress a request for a declaration of war in Iraq.
Similarly, the “total war” narrative was also inconsistent with the facts on the ground. The Iraq war was, in fact, limited in scope and resources at the outset. This minimized the impact felt by the Americans, personally, thus allowing the Administration to assume a narrative that resonated with a majority of the population without requiring their full-throttle support. In the short-term this gave the Administration free reign to prosecute the war. However, the long-term consequence of both narratives and the reality of the prosecution of the war was that the U.S. population failed to mobilize in support of the war and instead lost both interest and confidence in its merits.
By 2006 the Iraq War was in its third year with no exit in site. A new narrative developed and was promulgated widely by the Administration, journalists, and pundits across the country. Known as the “Surge Narrative” it created a new hero with a new strategy to save the day. The new hero was General David Patreaus and he was seen as a savior that arrived with new tactics to reverse the deteriorating conditions on the ground in Iraq. Again, the narrative played well to domestic audiences aching for some positive news and a home-grown hero after 9/11 and five years of war in two theaters.
In reality, this heroic tale had many holes. First, General Patreaus was not a new comer to the Iraq War in 2006, rather he had been part of the military leadership that had implemented policies such as, the de-Bathification of Iraq, that contributed to the inability of the U.S. to help Iraqis establish a stable government after the initial invasion. In addition, the Counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy that Patreaus was touted as having invented was in fact already being implemented in Iraq before he assumed command. And most problematic for the country, was that the narrative failed. Gen Pateaus’ actions were designed to buy time for the Iraqis to establish a sustainable for or democrat government in the country. Militarily, the surge fell woefully short in achieving this goal. Domestically, however, it did provide some hope to a war-weary public.
Transitioning to the perspectives of those who fought, lost loved-ones, and struggled to re-establish life at home, Caleb introduced the concept of the “Hero and Victims” narrative. Pointing out our opposing political camps (conservatives vs. liberals) tend to lump veterans into one of two categories. Heroes who fought bravely for a just cause and victims that were sent to their death for a lost cause. On their return, soldier heroes are deserving of our praise and gratefulness, whereas soldier victims are deserving of our resources and pity. Not surprising, oral histories of the war tend to align with one of these worldviews keeping the hero-victim narrative going.
In contrast to the ‘tale of two veterans’ narrative, Caleb maintains that most returning veterans adhere more to the concept of “post-traumatic growth,” negating the need to be either hero or victim. Instead they focus on the personal growth they, as individuals, gained from the negative and painful experiences of war. The consequence of the simplistic hero-victim narrative is that it furthers the divide between military veterans and civilian society, robbing the veteran of the opportunity to process their experiences absent a political worldview.
“Journalism is where we go to find the lies, fiction is where we go to find the truth.”
(Quote from a veteran fiction writer interviewed by Caleb for his book “War Narratives”)
The final narrative that Caleb shed light on is the notion that “real war can not be described in books.” Ascribed to Walt Whitman following the Civil War, the concept is that the tragedies of war are too poignant and personal to be adequately captured in either memoir or fiction. Drawing from his own experience and insight, Caleb cited several works of fiction written by Iraq war veterans that come closer to telling the truth about the war than news stories or non-fiction accounts. The authors of these tales tend to forgo political and sociocultural worldviews, striving instead to empathize with those who experiences are different from their own. Caleb left us with the thought that if the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are to be considered America’s first postmodern wars, then literacy fiction may be our best path to the truth about these wars.
Gary and Caleb both responded to questions during our discussion. Regarding Iraqi reconstruction, Caleb cautioned us about believing the narrative that the U.S. did not have a Phase 4 plan at the ready to conduct reconstruction in Iraq following the invasion. To the contrary, the U.S. government had many competing Phase 4 plans developed by State, USAID, DoD and others. However, no one in the Administration was assigned the role of coordinating and deconflicting these plans, so no one plan was implemented. The infighting between Secretaries Donald Rumsfled (DoD) and Collin Powell (State) in Bush’s first term and then Secretary Condolezza Rice (State) in his second term over who should control the $18b in reconstruction budget caused major setbacks on the ground and undermined our ability to achieve any lasting success.
“I write to make sense of things.”
(Caleb Cage)
Caleb addressed his motivation for writing his book, War Narratives, by explaining that he wanted to explore how we got into the situation we did in Iraq, what keeps us there today, and how can we avoid repeating similar mistakes in the future. He warned us to be cautious of future narratives that amplify a drumbeat for war. Encouraging us instead to work to understand the motivations and costs of engaging in future wars. Mindful of the need for Congress and the American people to be involved in future decisions to go to war, Caleb still supports the use of military force when appropriate and if it is done right. This means it does not saddle future generations with undo political, sociocultural and economic costs and it respects the lives and well-being of those who fight and those who support the war effort.
“Truth is absolute, but we are rarely absolutely certain about truth.”
(Gary Cage)
Assuming the role of philosopher, Gary addressed the question about how we find our way through the barrage of narratives we are exposed to and find truth about war. In short, the responsibility falls back on us to do the hard work of gathering information from multiple sources and honing our skills to critique both the information and the source.
By comparing and contrasting Iraq war narratives to those created during and after the war in Vietnam, Caleb illustrated similarities and differences in the stories told about these two conflicts. First, he returned to the theme that an all-volunteer army effectively distances the American civilian public from military decision-making, which makes it easier for government leaders to create narratives that fit their purpose. Following the Vietnam War, Presidential Administrations were anxious to professionalize the military. In meeting the laudable goal of improved military readiness, Presidents in the latter half of the 20th century essentially “outsourced war” to the U.S. military. This further contributed to the Civilian-Military Divide (CMD), distancing the American public from the realities of war. Furthermore, Caleb explained that the ‘Heroes and Victims Narrative’ emerged, starting in Desert Storm, as a counternarrative to the Vietnam War reversing the harsh way returning soldiers were treated by the American public.
“These books don’t shy away from hard truths about the reality of war”
(Caleb Cage)
Caleb shared several recommendations and reality checks about fiction and non-fiction books written about the Iraq War. Starting with non-fiction, he cited Tom Ricks book “Fiasco” as one of the seminal works that established the Surge Narrative. On the topic of fiction books about war that transcend popular narratives, Caleb cited Tim O’Brien’s book “The Things They Carried” about the Vietnam war as a critical counternarrative about the Vietnam War. Turning closer to home, Caleb recommended several works of fiction by Reno-native Matt Gallagher about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan including “Young Blood,” “Fire and Forget,” and “Kaboom” (all available on Amazon)
“We go nowhere if we don’t challenge the narrative that everyone who returns from war is broken.”
(Caleb Cage)
Turning to the topic of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the Heroes and Victims Narrative, Caleb cited his own experience both as a veteran and as someone who has worked extensively with other veterans. Originally skeptical of the PTSD diagnosis, Caleb has come to fully embrace the fact that PTSD is a scientifically-based medical disorder and those suffering from it are worthy of our resources, attention and compassion. That said, he emphatically stated that society gains nothing (and loses everything) if they continue to pigeonhole all those who suffered the trauma of war as “victims.” Veterans, in his experience, rarely invoke the “victim card” in describing their own experiences. The more positive counternarrative adopted by many veterans is that their war experiences (bad and good) are now fundamental to who they are personally and who they are in society. In Caleb’s vernacular, this is the narrative of “post traumatic growth.”
“Wars since WWII have been marginal in our lives, whereas WWII was our lives”
(Gary Cage)
One question that both Caleb and Gary addressed was the need to create positive cultural narratives about our one-time adversaries, as was done post-WWII, to garner public support for U.S. investments in reconstruction efforts in Japan. Asked if we have a similar positive narrative now about the people of Iraq that underpins our reconstruction efforts there, Caleb explained that our narratives about the Iraqi people were never as institutionally racist or demonizing of the Iraqis as they were of the Japanese. This is a positive development. Also, in contrast to military training in WWII, Caleb received extensive cultural awareness training before assuming his post as platoon leader in Iraq. This training was limited to military personnel and these positive narratives were rarely shared with the general public. In Caleb and Gary’s minds the U.S. population remains largely uninformed about the Iraqi people and their perspective on the war.
“We need to be open to the concept that we may be wrong.”
(Gary Cage, quoting Snoopy in ‘Peanuts’ the cartoon strip)
In closing, Caleb and Gary reflected on how we can learn from the Iraq war narratives to help us assess and conduct future conflicts. Caleb was definitive that we, as Americans, need to act to ensure our government engages us in critical decisions about taking the country to war. War is not something that the U.S. military should handle on its own, rather it is a burden and responsibility that we, as citizens in a democratic society, share. Caleb also stressed that Congress has the constitutional responsibility to declare war. Congress has not formally exercised this responsibility since 1941 when Roosevelt requested a declaration of war on Japan the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In contrast, all President’s since WWII have engaged in military conflicts under softer and less stringent Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF).
Going to war should be a hard decision for any President and Congress and the American people have a role in assessing if the conflict in our national interest, the desired outcomes, and what sacrifices are we willing to make to achieve our goals. Gary closed by encouraging all of us to listen to narratives about war with a critical eye. Remain skeptical, but engaged. And always remember that in the end you and the stories you hear may be wrong.
For those who did not get a chance to purchase Caleb’s book at the meeting you can still purchase a copy on Amazon:
Caleb S. Cage, was appointed as Nevada Chief of the Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security Adviser on July 6, 2015 by Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, and a veteran of the war in Iraq. He was commissioned in 2002 as a Field Artillery officer and assigned to the 1st Infantry Division in Bamberg, Germany. During this period, he served as a company executive officer and later as a motorized rifle platoon leader in the city of Baqubah, Iraq. He also served a second tour of Iraq in 2006 as a Corps Information Operations battle captain. After separating from the Army in 2007, Cage served as Senior Policy Adviser to Nevada Lieutenant Governor Brian Krolicki and in was appointed to serve as Executive Director of the Nevada Office of Veterans Services (NOVS) in 2010. Cage also established Nevada’s Green Zone Initiative, an effort to improve outcomes for veterans. He is the author of several books including, “War Narratives” and “Desert Mementos: Stories of Iraq and Nevada” and co-author of “The Gods of Diyala: Transfer of Command in Iraq.” He holds a Bachelor of Science in American History from United States Military Academy, West Point, and a Master’s in Homeland Security from the Naval Postgraduate School. He lives in Reno with his wife and three children.