Program Summary
Bad Decisions, Bad Consequences: The Perils of Misreading North Korea
Presentation and discussion on 22 and 23 October 2018 with:
Robert Carlin
Visiting Fellow
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
Robert Carlin shared an insightful and stark discussion about both life and politics in North Korea with the National Security Forum. Drawing from his experiences on over 30 trips to the country, Bob shared his personal stories about the North Korean people and their country with the NSF Friends of the Forum dinner on Monday evening 21 October. During our NSF meeting on Tuesday 22, he focused on how these personal observations manifest in political challenges for the United States and other countries when addressing the “North Korean problem.”
“It is a tough, ugly place no doubt about it…but that does not mean they are not real people, they are not Koreans and that the place does not function like other places on Planet Earth. The two-dimensional view portrayed of North Korea in commentaries deprives us of seeing what we are up against and what the opportunities are.” (Robert Carlin’s opening remarks)
To illustrate this point, Bob addressed three questions in his presentation; What do we know about North Korea? How do we know it? and Where do we go from here? Starting with the second question, he cautioned us to not be duped by the oft cited remark that North Korea is a black hole what we know nothing about. Accepting that premise has led too many politicians to adopt the posture that if we know nothing about them we can do whatever we want in response.
The U.S. Military and Intelligence Community (IC) have gathered extensive information about the country and its leaders since the early 1970’s when most of us only knew about the country from watching episodes of MASH. Over the last several decades we have learned much more about the country. At present there is a plethora of information available on the internet derived from NGOs, academics and tourists working or visiting the country. Even more is available in Chinese, Russian and Korean language sources.
Bob learned this first hand when he worked for Open Source Works, an unclassified CIA program, mining the internet for open source information on North Korea. This experience led him and others to conclude that there is a lot more important information about “hidden regimes” available from unclassified sources than is often found in classified reports. Outside of specific technical details about the North Korean military and nuclear programs, this treasure trove of accessible information should (but rarely does) inform policy-making in the United States. In Bob’s opinion, the best source of information by far is what the North Korean media says to the outside world and they are constantly sending signals to people inside and outside.
While teaching a class recently at Stanford University aptly named “Reading North Korea”, Bob coined the “L-A-T-T-E” method to help his students read media communications from Pyongyang. Bob’s version of this well-developed methodology for reading communications from totalitarian regimes, starts with “L” for “level” of the output. Communications presented or vetted by the most authoritative sources in the political hierarchy carry the messages they want the outside and inside world to hear the most. Second is “A” for “audience.” Pay close attention to who are the intended recipients of the statements and ignore the usual propaganda fluff. Third “T” is for “timing” especially when the communications come in the middle of a crisis. Normal reaction time for the North Korean state media to respond to world events is 3-4 days. A significantly faster indicates the event had significant impact and/or they intend to take action to escalate or de-escalate the issue. The most difficult characteristic to assess is “T” for “tone.” In general, North Korea uses a very aggressive vocabulary in their communications, so tone needs to be assessed not for a given message, but in the context of how they have addressed the topic in past communications. Finally, “E” is “everything else.” Context matters most!
“During over 100 hours of Agreed Framework negotiations with North Korea in the late 1990s and early 2000s, we learned much more about our counterparts by sitting across the table from them listening to their words, watching their body language, and laughing at their jokes.”
As an intelligence officer for over 33 years, Bob had access to all levels of classified information about North Korea. Yes, there were nuggets of valuable details in all those files with bright red covers, but often the IC missed nuance because of an overreliance on secret information. Reading unclassified messages from authoritarian regimes still vexes the IC, whose culture is based on stealing and guarding secrets not listening to what’s said in the open. Bob emphasized that context, not just content, is the key to understanding North Korean. By analyzing the LATTE traits, Bob taught his students to interpret not just the words, but also the intended meaning behind their communications. A word of caution to all of us, including policy pundits and national security journalists, is to avoid falling into the trap of responding to words spoken by North Korean leaders without hearing their meaning and heeding their message.
“My conclusion is that North Korea got as far as they did in large part due to bad decisions by the United States”
Returning to his first question – “What do we know about North Korean?” – Bob shared the basic facts (now unclassified) about the state of the North Korean nuclear program. In summary, as of the end of 2017 the international community believes they have about 30-40 kg of plutonium, enough to build 5-7 nuclear weapons. They have significantly more highly enriched uranium (HEU), probably 250-500 kg, which is enough for an additional10-20 weapons. HEU estimates or more uncertain since the IC doesn’t know for sure how many and what type of centrifuges they have (or had) because there is no verification framework in place now. In total, the IC estimates that North Korea has 20-35 nuclear weapons (maybe more) assuming they used most of the fissile material they produced.
We also know they have conducted six nuclear tests, at least five of which demonstrated the viability of their designs. Given the level of device and missile testing conducted to date they can probably arm short and medium range missiles with nuclear devices. These missiles easily cover South Korea and Japan, but are unlikely to reach the United States. If their longer-range missiles are fully functional and if they are able to engineer them to carry nuclear devices (both very big ‘ifs’) then they could strike the United States. That said, Bob reminded us that the North Korean leadership is not stupid or rash. They know they need more tests to verify performance, accuracy, and effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent. In short, the answer to the succinct question, “Do they have a credible nuclear arsenal?” is a definite “yes” and Bob’s strong belief is that the U.S. bears much responsibility in allowing them to get to “yes.”
So where are we now and where do we go from here?
We are now faced with a North Korea that has a potent arsenal that can wreak havoc at least on our allies and our military if not on our homeland. The good news is that North Korea does not want to launch a nuclear strike against us. That would be crazy and they are definitely not crazy. So why are they building, testing, and showcasing their nuclear program? Bob maintains that ever since the Bush Administration killed the Agreed Framework negotiations in 2003, Pyongyang has been determined to demonstrate a credible nuclear program so that the U.S. would take them seriously. Even after the Agreed Framework that was initiated by the Clinton Administration was abandoned, the North continued to invite esteemed nuclear scientist and former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Dr. Sigfried Hecker, to visit their nuclear facilities and share progress on the nuclear program.
Why? Clearly they did not want these activities to be a secret. They wanted the U.S. to know where they were step-by-step in the hopes of getting a response from the U.S. And all they got in response during many years of the Bush and Obama U.S. Administrations was…crickets. This led Kim Yong Un to believe that the only way to get the attention of the U.S. was to show that Pyongyang could credibly threaten the U.S. To that end, he conducted two intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests in the summer of 2017 and that woke up Washington and a new President. Having proven their point and gotten the attention they wanted from the U.S., Kim quickly pivoted his attention away from sabre rattling to a renewed focus on diplomacy and improving the economy at home. Is he serious? Will he really cap, rollback and eliminate his long fought for political bargaining chip? Maybe…time will tell.
In Bob’s view, the U.S. has lost diplomatic momentum and is on the precipice of going from bad to worse. With the (then) upcoming midterms in the U.S., the political dynamic in Washington on this and other is likely to change. In the meantime, South Korean is conducting its own bilateral negotiations with the North. The U.S. appears to be attempting to stonewall North-South engagement (to no avail), which is causing a growing gulf between Washington and Seoul. Reading the North Korean media, with LATTE in hand, Bob believes that we are also witnessing a struggle inside the North Korean political establishment about whether denuclearization is really a viable and sensible path. If negotiations fail now we risk heading down a much more dangerous path. Today we face a fully armed adversary that feels spurned, once again, by perceived arrogance and indifference from U.S. leaders. So, grab that LATTE and hold on for the next chapter in this unfolding national security saga.
Fielding a litany of questions, Bob shed even more light on the topic starting with a more in-depth look at North Koreas relationships with the U.S. and its closest neighbors, South Korea, Japan and China. Bob reminded us that looking forward requires informed reflection on past events. First, he debunked the common wisdom that everything we have tried with North Korea for last 25 years has failed. He vehemently disagrees with this concept and believes it is leading us farther away from viable solutions. In particular, he reminded us that the Agreed Framework that was in place from 1994 to 2003 had in fact succeeded. Its greatest accomplishment was to halt plutonium production leaving Pyongyang with only a small antiquated reactor. It also improved relations throughout the region including those between the Koreas and with Japan.
Policy pundits interject here, “yes, but they cheated by producing HEU.” True, but HEU was not part of the Agreed Framework. Bob fully admits that it was bad politics on Pyongyang’s part to produce HEU under the nose of the Agreed Framework, which in turn led the U.S. to abandon its hold on the North Korean nuclear program. Ironically, the U.S. had suspected their HEU capabilities as far back as the LATE 1990s and couched language (that Bob authored) in the US-DPRK 2000 Joint Communique designed to lay the groundwork for addressing the North’s HEU Program. Shortly thereafter, the Bush Administration came in and opposed the Agreed Framework, officially killing it in 2003. Since that time the U.S. has been wandering aimlessly on the North Korean issue without a diplomatic compass.
“In January 2001 North Korea had zero nuclear weapons, now they have 30-40.”
As of 2018 North Korea is capable of producing fissile material for 6-7 nuclear weapons a year. This is very bad outcome for both U.S. and everyone else in the region. Bob’s biggest concern is that in 5 years Pyongyang will have arsenal of 50-70 nuclear weapons and that can be mounted on an inventory of fully-tested ICBMs. At this point we will have lost all leverage and credibility with Japan and abdicated leadership in the region to China. This scenario does not have to become reality. Ever the optimist, Bob encourages the U.S. to return to a multifaceted diplomacy that supports and does not undermine South Korea’s overtures to the North and keeps all channels of dialogue open.
What about North Korea’s relationship with Japan and China?
Bob was succinct and to the point. The Japan-North Korea relationship is many times worse than it needs to be. Lingering questions about abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea still angers Japan and impedes meaningful dialogue. Stabilizing the region requires Japan’s engagement and leadership and Japan needs to get back in the game. As for China, North Korea does not like China and the feeling is mutual. Their contemporary coziness is an act that captures the media, especially those who don’t drink LATTEs. Even during the Korean War, the DPRK (AKA North Korea) and China did not get along; however, the primacy of geography means that neither side can afford to let the relationship deteriorate too far. The current bon-ami is a fiction that both parties are using to poke a finger in the eye of Trump Administration. Fundamentally, North Korea needs to be on speaking terms with China, but it needs to do so without being subsumed by China politically and economically. In 1991, Kim Jong Il made the strategic decision to focus North Korea’s international engagement on United States. This pivot west avoided having to play ball with an intensely antagonistic Russia and an untrustworthy China. Now both China and North Korea are playing a game of BFF (best friends forever) to get the U.S. to stay engaged. Whether we emerge as active, constructive players for the Korean Peninsula or continue on our policy of angry disengagement remains to be seen.
Regarding the proliferation of missiles to Iran and chemical weapons to Syria and elsewhere, Bob noted the sad reality that plutonium is extremely easy to proliferate. At present, we do not have evidence that North Korea has proliferated fissile material, but they certainly did help the Syrians build a production reactor…for a price. Once discovered, the U.S. issued a tepid and underwhelming response that did not hold Pyongyang responsible for this egregious case of nuclear technology proliferation. As a result, the North is likely not deterred from doing this again in the future. Bob’s pointed advice to current and future Administrations is that the U.S. needs to convey to Pyongyang and others that the cost nuclear proliferation is far beyond any potential near-term gains. Messages like this could be conveyed regularly if U.S. scientists and diplomats were actively engaged in discussions with their North Korean counterparts on a regular basis. Beyond the nuclear threat Bob gravely stated that chemical weapons in North Korea are a nightmare. At least some of their artillery shells on the border are likely armed with Soviet-era chemical weapons. This threat further complicates future negotiations.
“We need less spies in the leadership of North Korea and more in the markets and bazaars.”
Returning to questions about the social fabric of individuals in North Korea, Bob commented that the leadership can no longer ignore the economic and social needs of its citizens. Life is hard for North Koreans, but it was equally difficult for South Koreans into the 1970s. The economy in North Korea is improving, marginally, and there are signs that individuals are gently pushing the regime to change. This trend will likely be accelerated by improved North-South relations and a return to active economic exchange with China. Until recently hundreds of thousands of North Koreas had traveled to China for business and education. These exchanges fertilized ideas and brought technological advances to North Korean individuals and leaders that is stimulating development. Appealing to the large Roman Catholic population in South Korea, Kim Jong Un has invited Pope Francis to visit. This gutsy move, in Bob’s opinion, has the potential to loosen the logjam of international diplomacy if (and this is a big if) the Pope choses to listen carefully and is able to constructively bridge the North-South divide.
In closing, Bob gave some insight into the Inspector O detective series written by James Church. These books are an effort to show how the noir detective genre works in a North Korean setting and to provide insight into the life, politics, and psyche of the North Korean people. To that end, I strongly recommended reading these books while sipping a latte.
Mr. Robert Carlin, is a Visiting Fellow at Stanford’s CISAC. He has a Masters degree in East Asian Studies from Harvard University and a Bachelors of Arts in Political Science from Claremont McKenna College. Among his many accomplishments described above, he also authored in 2013 an updated revision to Don Oberdorfer’s classic history of the Korean Peninsula, “The Two Koreas.” This tour de force book is highly recommended reading for the diligent NSF student. For a bit lighter fare with perhaps equal insight, Bob recommends NSFers indulge in reading the “Inspector O” series by James Church. These engaging detective novels set in the mysterious world of North Korea tell tales of intrigue and mystery that could only have been penned by one who knows this world well