Summary of NSF Presentation on….
Conducting Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations
Keith Hansen and Frank Partlow provided vignettes from their respective experiences in negotiating nuclear arms control treaties with the Soviets/Russians and others. In particular, they explained what it was like in the trenches to successfully negotiate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which was signed in 1987 between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.
Their goal was to illuminate the complexities and subtleties of such negotiations in an effort to provide insights into what is actually happening on the ground in current talks with Iran. Moreover, they wanted the audience to understand that despite the “theater” of such negotiations reported by the media, no agreement is ever consummated absent hard work by the “boots on the ground” negotiators in the trenches.
To begin they explained who was on the US INF delegation and why (see slide #1), how delegation members interacted with their respective agencies in Washington, with each other in Geneva, and with the Soviet delegation. They emphasized that the US delegation had to have access to direct and rapid communication with Washington.
They also explained that any treaty text must address and include agreement on three components (see slide #2): basic obligations and commitments, effective verification provisions to deter and, if necessary detect cheating, and legal requirements for the treaty to function.
With that as background, their presentation included the following points:
- For any treaty to succeed it must pass three tests: successful negotiations “with ourselves” in Washington, with the other country or countries, and finally with the Senate which must give its advice and consent. At times the most difficult step was the first one, and the delegation was always “looking over its shoulders” at the Senate. In the case of INF, US Senators visited Geneva, met with the Soviets, and influenced the outcome of the negotiations for the better.
- Without firm deadlines, there is a danger that negotiations can go on forever. INF negotiations had been going on for two years without getting close to agreement. However, during the late summer of 1987, following their Reykjavik Summit meeting in October 1986, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev announced that they wanted to sign an INF treaty in December. This was a surprise to both delegations in Geneva and led to a flurry of intense activity and fatigue in an effort to work through the details and meet the deadline. Back-channel exchanges (i.e. capital to capital negotiations between heads of state) often parallel what is going on between delegations. However, even though the outlines of an agreement had been reached at the higher level, the “devil is always in the details”, and intense hard work was required to resolve the remaining differences.
- Informal meetings (one-on-one discussions, lunches, etc.) between members of the delegations were where the real negotiations took place. Only by establishing rapport and trust could meaningful dialogue and exchange of opinions occur so that differences could be bridged. However, such meetings required that everything be discussed through interpreters and with the aid of assistants, and then the results dutifully reported back to the delegation and Washington. Language and cultural differences had to be sorted out so that the final treaty language was clearly understood and consistent in all languages.
- The Intelligence Community’s (IC) role was to provide accurate information to US policymakers in Washington and to the negotiators in Geneva regarding the activities and goals of the other side. In the US the IC does not recommend or advocate policy. Ultimately the IC was required to testify to its ability to monitor the other side’s adherence to the treaty provisions in the Senate ratification process.
- The ratification process required senior US officials (State, Defense, & IC) to testify before the Senate to the utility for US security, the verifiability, and the military sufficiency of the signed treaty. In the case of INF the administration had to respond in writing to 1,300 congressional questions; all answers had to be cleared by all agencies and the White House.
- Implementation of the INF Treaty’s on-site verification provisions required allowing Soviet inspectors into US nuclear weapon exclusion areas from which even most US service members, let alone civilians, are barred from entering. This required explaining to those in charge that it was OK. This was the first treaty in which the US and USSR agreed to allow on-site inspections of their nuclear forces, so those “on the ground” had to be included in treaty implementation.
Brigadier General Frank Partlow was the US Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons (INF) talks with the former Soviet Union from 1986 through ratification of the INF Treaty by the US Senate in 1988. Keith Hansen was the Director of Central Intelligence representative to the INF negotiations from 1985-1987. He also served on US delegations to the SALT II and CTBT negotiations. As such, they were among the “boots on the ground” during these negotiations.