THE ARMY IN RETREAT
By Dr. Tyrus W. Cobb
February, 2014
“What could not be carried out against the U.S. Army on the desert plains of Iraq or the snowy mountains of Afghanistan in 12 years of war is being accomplished now….What no foreign enemy could force on the battle- field is being done by our own national politics: degrading the Army’s combat might.” –Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine, Dec 2013The Army is programmed to shrink considerably as budget constraints and strategic realities combine to impose deep cuts in the current force structure. From a high of over 570,000 just a few years ago, the Army is now slated to fall to 490,000 active duty soldiers. There has been some speculation that end strength could drop to as low as 410,000, but 490,000 seems set! “The last time the Army confronted a drawdown of this magnitude was in the late 1980’s”, COL Rick Sinnreich (USA-Ret) notes, a rapid drawdown driven by the collapse of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and the reunification of Germany. Of course, Sinnreich adds, “scarcely two years after the demolition of the Berlin Wall, the Army found itself mounting a conventional offensive again”, the first since the Korean War. In that campaign an Army built to defeat a Soviet attack on West Europe “made short shrift of Saddam Hussein’s ill-trained conscripts”.
No matter—despite what some fear would be a major miscalculation–that we can afford to reduce the size of our land force component and rely more on naval and air forces combined with high technology—there are few proponents in the Pentagon, on the Hill, or in the White House, who favor maintaining a large Army today.
The Impact of the New Budget and Strategic Environment
There is a significant transformation ongoing within defense strategic thinking, fueled by the winding down of the “wars of intervention” in the Middle East and the shift in the focus of defense planning guidance away from that region to the Western Pacific. Further, programmed and anticipated budget cuts to defense, much of that the outcome of the ill-conceived sequestration mandate, have led the Pentagon leadership to move away from large, costly (personnel heavy) land forces toward a greater reliance on naval and air power.
A double whammy for the Army—it’s key role in the era of “wars of intervention” in the Arab world and its current force structure represent “old think”, and are financially and strategically out of step. Indeed, some feel that if the Army has any role in future contingency planning, it is more with respect to the Service’s ability to rapidly deploy light, high technology and airmobile force packages. However, the Army is built on a reliance on heavy systems such as MRAP, GOV, Stryker, etc., that if anything are adding weight, not subtracting.
Budget reductions have already forced the Army to cut back severely on readiness, training and operations, as well as personnel. When the 490,000 end strength goal was announced, the Army said it would have to cut 10 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) over 4 years. Major reductions in training and readiness have also been implemented–amazingly, the Army today reports that it has only 2—yes, 2—BCTs “combat ready”, both in the 82nd Airborne Division. The Army hopes that funding will permit it to increase that number to 7 BCTs by June.
The ill-conceived “sequestration” mandate is a major factor in this loss of readiness. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta observed that sequestration, when initially proposed, “was so bad, no one in their right minds would let it happen”. But it did, and it impacted defense harder than any other major sector of the budget, and within DOD, the Army has taken the biggest hit.
But the budget cuts are only part of what is causing the Army to fall “into eclipse”, as one observer caustically noted. The other factors are the changing strategic environment and the lack of any appetite for engagement in lengthy combat operations abroad. Presently, there is no desire among the American public or its elected leaders to contemplate any major land war in the future. Very few are willing even to consider the possibility of a conflict with China or Russia, at least one that would require a sustained deployment of major land forces.
The focus of the most recent defense planning guidance shifts away from the Mideast and prolonged U.S. military intervention to the western Pacific. It relies primarily on naval and air strike forces, augmented at best by Special Operations Forces. While the guidance still theoretically mandates a capability to fight a major campaign, in reality that has fallen off the planning radar screen. Given this political reality and in the face of severe budget cuts, many see no reason to maintain an Army prepared for major engagements.
The Army Struggles to Maintain Relevance
For the Army this means it had better demonstrate that it can provide forces capable of rapid deployment, light enough for air transport, and focused on missions such as rescuing U.S. citizens caught in a civil conflict abroad or specialized tasks like killing Osama bin Laden. In the past some critics said we did not need the U.S. Marines since there was no requirement for two major land-focused capabilities. Now some are wondering if the Army is fated to defend itself from being labeled a “second Marine Corps!”.
The question today is less what size the Army will be, but what kind of Army is required, and to do what? Most strategists as well as force planners do not see another Desert Storm type of operation, nor do they anticipate another decade-long counter-insurgency. The Army is best at defeating a well-equipped major adversary on the ground for lengthy operations; it is not the nation’s “911 force”—that’s a role for the Marine Corps. But the budgetary and strategic environment combine to place what the Army does best well back in the pecking order of contingency planning.
Yes, there are warnings by experienced military professionals who caution that we do not get to choose the war we want; indeed as is often observed, “the enemy gets the decisive vote”. (However, in fact, we—as a nation—have essentially chosen to fight the recent major engagements, the long counter-insurgency conflicts in the Middle East.) They also point out, correctly, that we have not been very good at forecasting “the next war”, and that often it demands well equipped and ready land forces to serve as the anchor in those conflicts.
Some war games lead to the conclusion that the Army must prepare for rapid insertion to counter crisis situations. Eliminating or securing weapons of mass destruction is one; helping allies maintain security and stability is another. This is not what the Army is geared for—it prefers the more traditional missions, but the changing strategic environment is working against “big Army”.
Experts also advise that a reliance on emerging technologies to overcome adversaries hasn’t worked well in reality, nor does it seem to do so in war game exercises. These war games often evolve into commitments of major land forces to stabilize crisis situations, but defense planners shy away from this conclusion, hoping, apparently, that technology will in the end prove more resilient. Doesn’t matter—it is what it is, and what is, is a focus on the Pacific, on air and naval strike forces, and rapidly deployable Special Operations units.
The budget and strategic shifts have also led to increased in-fighting within the various components, as the National Guard and the Reserves are making the case for placing more reliance on those forces. Politically well connected, the Guard and to a lesser extent, the Reserves, are finding receptive ears in Congress.
The Army Strains to Maintain Readiness, Internal Cohesion, and Troop Morale
After years of war, the Army is forced to adapt to garrison life, the NYT’s Thom Shanker recently wrote (Jan 18). As Shanker observes, after 12 years of war following the 9/11 attacks, the Army suddenly finds itself no longer preparing units for deployments to the combat zones. Instead, the Army now must “sustain the morale of soldiers who have returned to American bases and are living what the military calls garrison life”, Shanker writes. That means that most of the 2 million Americans who went to war are home, adjusting to new lives, and “seeking to find relevance in the face of an uncertain future”.
The transition to garrison life means that soldiers face enormous adjustments. As one returning trooper told Shanker, “You transition from one mind-set—you roll out of your cot and you seek to find and destroy the enemy….to coming back to the States where we ….want you to drive safely!” In the combat zone officers had responsibilities far above their pay grade, from commanding units in intense combat, to mediating intra-tribal disputes, to managing major civic construction projects. Now they deal with commissary hours, barracks inspections, and the shine of a soldier’s boots, all the while looking over their shoulders knowing that deep RIFs (forced out of the service) loom ahead. For the enlisted force, the absence of the adrenaline flow from the perils of the combat zone invariably lead to an increase in domestic disputes, driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and other anti-social behavior.
And so the Army will continue to struggle for relevance
In summary, the Army is facing a number of deep challenges, from the changing strategic environment to maintaining readiness and an adequate force structure in the face of budget cuts, to preserving internal cohesion. It’s too early to call this “An Army in Retreat”, but it certainly seems to be an Army struggling to maintain relevance and force structure in the face of a strategic and fiscal environment rapidly changing to its disadvantage.