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The Seminal Challenge from North Korea:

The Seminal Challenge from North Korea:

Korea

What Should We Do? What Realistically Can We Do?

I. Introduction

  • The North Korean regime continues its threatening behavior, despite international sanctions, universal condemnation and fears about its own internal stability. This year alone it has launched two attacks on South Korea, stepped up its nuclear weapons program (and invited Western experts to witness this “progress”), continued to engage in illicit global activities, and represses its own people.
  • There is universal agreement that the NK regime under Kim Jong Il must be confronted for its continuing transgressions. The problem is that there is little agreement among South Korea’s neighbors and the U.S. with respect to what should be done or what can be accomplished. All agree that Pyongyang’s actions are so blatant that the regime must be confronted.
  • “If ever a ruling elite seemed to justify the Bush-era doctrine of “preemption”, it is the Kim dynasty in North Korea. No government subjects its people to such a barbarous regime of fear, repression and hunger. And the Kims are complicit in….murderous terrorism, nuclear proliferation, drug-smuggling and currency counterfeiting”, one expert correctly noted.
  • NK is undergoing a difficult leadership transition, with power apparently shifting from Kim Jong Il to his 27-year old 3rd son, Kim Jong Un (recently promoted to 4-star general). Kim Jong Un is on shaky ground at best—he has little “legitimacy” or record of accomplishment. This fragile transition is occurring as NK society is cracking, its population starving……NK just imposed a crippling revaluation of its currency, food shortages and near famine are still part of daily life, and internal political tensions are on the rise as the elder Kim’s health fails.
  • The time for “Strategic Patience”, the Obama approach, and Engagement, which Bush 43 followed even in the face of NK provocations, are hollow and have little chance for success. Having said that, the alternative–any serious reprisal, most importantly military confrontation–risks launching a war that could lead to a spiral of escalation, catastrophic war, incalculable damage and significant loss of life. This is a nuclear-armed rouge regime with a very large, well equipped conventional army.
  • If the crisis escalates domestically or internationally, can either Kim pull back from confrontation as they have done in the past?

II. North Korea’s Record of Uncivilized Behavior

  • In 1968, NK commandoes staged an attack on the Presidential Palace (Blue House) in attempt to assassinate President Park; in 1983, NK agents killed four members of the South Korean (SK) cabinet on a visit to Burma; in 1987 they caused an explosion on an airplane that killed 115; naval skirmishes occurred at least 4 times…..NK agents hijacked a SK airliner; NK MiGs attacked a US recon plane but were fought off…..They captured the US intelligence ship, the Pueblo, in international waters; shot down a US recon plane, killing 31 Americans…..NK fired a missile over Japan….In 1974 two American officers were killed by North Koreans wielding axes along the DMZ….innumerable kidnappings of Japanese and SK citizens.
  • This year NK sank the SK warship, the ChonAn, killing half of the sailors, in international waters. Last week NK artillery shelled a remote island, killing 4.
  • The NK nuclear program has continued apace despite endless talks, negotiations and call for restraint. Agreement after agreement is hammered out and the 6 parties then resume shipments of food and fuel, and remove sanctions. The North again cheats on the agreement, creates another crisis, and continues its headlong development of a full scale nuclear weapons program……Even worse, it exports nuclear materials and technology, including to Iran and Syria….. When international reaction grows, NK signals it is ready for an agreement ending its weapons program. Jimmy Carter writes anguished op-ed indicating Pyongyang is really serious this time.

III. What are the U.S., South Korea, and their Partners Doing?

  • There is little agreement amongst the regional players, including the U.S. If anything, the North Korean actions have led to serious tensions between the “allies”.
  • SK Defense Minister resigns in wake of two unprovoked attacks, neither of which did SK mount a reprisal operation against…..Seoul did shut down an industrial park just inside NK considered vital to employment of North Koreans, and a valuable source of hard currency.
  • US initially cancels planned joint operations (Hoguk 2010), to the dismay of SK. Perhaps White House/Pentagon concerned over potential for inflaming tensions on the peninsula; but now agrees to deploy aircraft carrier group to nearby waters. Will conduct joint naval maneuvers with SK…NK calls this a ”provocation” and “act of war”.
  • Over the years, the US and its partners in the “6-Party Talks” have issued numerous diplomatic protests, made heartfelt pleas to the United Nations for condemnation, and imposed economic sanctions.
  • China is regarded as the crucial denominator here. For a number of reasons it has thwarted any tough actions against NK, and keeps the fledging regime alive through food, fuel and economic aid….Why is China so unhelpful? Many possible reasons, none very convincing: (1) They worry a collapse of the regime will flood China with refugees; (2) It may fear a NK collapse would lead to reunification under SK/US control.
  • U.S. must change Beijing’s calculus so that China deters the North from further escalation (at a minimum) and hopefully that Pyongyang halts its commitment to a nuclear weapons program (much harder)….”Beijing’s opening response—an expression of sympathy and a call for restraint on all sides, and immediate resumption of the 6-Party talks—is not promising”, said one observer…Don’t expect much help from China, which has made a short-sighted calculation to prop up the Kim dynasty as a buffer state.
  • U.S. must consider moving from “Strategic Patience”, the Obama administration’s term, to harder line. Patient approach same as that of Bush 43, which continued to reward NK’s “occasional, symbolic diplomatic gestures” with bilateral meetings and relief from sanctions.

IV. What Can Anyone Do?

  • The U.S. and SK must consider military reprisals against NK, but hard to implement discrete actions that do not carry the risk of escalation.
  • US/SK concern that NK has multitudes of hardened artillery positions within range of downtown Seoul, home to nearly half the SK population, 24% of its industry. Would serious reprisals risk existence of SK capital?
  • US/SK could launch combat operations against the north. That would surely mean all-out war and the concomitant damage and casualties that would cause……And, with the two wars it is already conducting, is the US in a position to engage North Korea in a war—one that might go nuclear?
  • We could and should impose hard economic restrictions on any firm doing business with NK, which would mean throttling hundreds of Chinese companies who have vested commercial interests…..A crackdown on NK’s illicit financial global activities is necessary, even if that means Chinese companies.

V:  Conclusion

  • There has been a lot of anguished hand wringing over what steps would be appropriate to take to counter North Korea’s decades of serious transgressions. Most seem to agree that now is not the time to reward Pyongyang with more fuel, food and economic assistance,nor is it the time for a renewal of the “6-party talks” that have gone nowhere.
  • The problem is that no one has come up with any alternatives that don’t carry the serious risk of further escalation and all-out war, possibly involving nuclear weapons.
  • I don’t have any great ideas, except to turn over more of the responsibility to China. I’d look forward to getting suggestions from you that would cause a change in North Korean behavior without risking a damaging conflagration. Thanks!

–      Tyrus W. Cobb

November 29, 2010