



Veneratio Diligentia Vires

Red on Red: Security Situation in Nepal

Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D.

Classic IED

R

Recent political violence in Nepal (see Figure 1) by the radical Chand aka Biplav faction should not have come as a surprise. Behind the national self-congratulation at ending the insurgency in November 2006 through negotiation, all Maoist factions continued to use terrorism to ensure the outcome of polls and to dominate local areas, thus to recruit and amass the funds needed for political action. In fact, turning a blind-eye to such violence has been a hallmark of the post-conflict order. Now, events have progressed to the point that this is no longer possible, as radical Maoist insurgent actions against a communist government – that includes the mainstream Maoists – have forced a reaction. The result is a fraught Red on Red confrontation that places individual security further at risk.

The government, all political parties, and Nepali society itself are profoundly divided as to how to proceed. That the populace is not interested in a renewal of conflict is clear enough, even as thousands have continued to fall victim of Maoist coercion and violence. The ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP),

which most recently has found itself explaining why it had been maneuvered by its Maoist faction into backing the loathsome Maduro dictatorship in Venezuela, has moved from lackadaisical ignorance concerning the security situation to embarrassing bravado. Prime Minister KP

Sharma Oli most recently is quoted as boasting, “The government will control the criminal and destructive activities [of the Chand outfit] within 15 days. ... We will make them join the political mainstream by April 13. The group will be brought to mainstream politics, if possible politically, if not by even putting ‘the pseudo comrades’ behind bars.”(1) Foolish on its merits, the passage does not explain the government’s previous express orders to the security forces to ignore what it claimed were “political acts” by the Chand aka Biplav group. Now, with a 12 March 2019 “banning” of the estranged comrades, the NCP finds itself divided from within and at odds with both the law – the legal framework to support its orders is lacking – and the very party that led the previous conflict against the Maoists, Nepali Congress (NC).

Astonishingly, it has been security figures who have correctly emphasized the political essence of a challenge the government has suddenly decided to label criminal. Beyond all else, there is the hollow ring of the label “pseudo comrades” adopted by the NCP. For it has not escaped notice in Nepal and elsewhere that the Chand aka Biplav faction is doing nothing more than carrying Maoist rhetoric and strategy to



Mainstream Maoist leader, Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda (“Renowned,” though “Fierce One” is most common in Western media) has claimed all along that the use of opportunistic, covert terrorism was producing results, while leaders of rival radical Maoist groups, especially Netra Bikram Chand aka Biplav (“Revolt” or “Rebel”), see an actual revolution nowhere in sight and thus favor systematic, overt terrorism such as marked the 2017 election cycle.

preceded it for the previous two decades save the mainstream Maoist claim “now everything is different.” True to a point, this assessment is normally followed with another NCP claim, that Chand aka Biplav should follow the mainstream example and embrace “nonviolence.” The claim that violence has been renounced, though, is inaccurate, and it is to that point that this assessment will speak.

Threat From the Extreme Left

The period of extensive terrorism discussed in previous articles in Counterterrorism serves to highlight the intense debate that continues within the Maoists: how aggressively and in what form to use violence in the post-2006 (i.e., post-war) period. Mainstream Maoist leader, Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda (“Renowned,” though “Fierce One” is most common in Western media) has claimed all along that the use of opportunistic, covert terrorism was producing results, while leaders of rival radical Maoist groups, especially Netra Bikram Chand aka Biplav (“Revolt” or “Rebel”), see an actual revolution nowhere in sight and thus favor systematic, overt terrorism such as marked the 2017 election cycle. Ultimately, in the strategy advocated by the latter, terrorism would be accompanied by the use of urban mobilization and guerrilla warfare linked to action in the countryside along the lines pursued in 1996-2006.

From Dahal’s perspective, this Chand aka Biplav position not only is incorrect but misses the dramatic strategic shift that has occurred. The mainstream Maoists, he claims, have won – and won using terrorism not provocatively so as to provoke response but subtly in order to be effective.

A combination of violence and deft political action has resulted in communist rule and can maintain it. The Maoists hold key positions (e.g., the vice presidency) and ministries (notably the




Figure 1: Current administrative structure. The model borrow from that of India to place states above the district level. Thus far, Provinces 4, 6, and 7 have names; respectively, Gandaki, Karnali, and Sudur Paschim.

a logical end. It is the government and the NCP, claim the Chandists, who are not “real communists,” hence revolt is the only option.

When considered within the closed loop of Marxist-Leninist logic, such a stance is not far off. In reality, there is little difference between what is unfolding and what

Home Ministry); they control the police, as well as elements of the intelligence apparatus; they also have complete control over two of the seven provinces (Provinces 6 and



7 in Figure 1), which include many of their legacy areas of domination occasioned by their wartime and post-war use of terrorism. Finally, in a formal undertaking, the UML faction (of the NCP) has agreed in three

years' time to move Dahal to the prime ministership for the final two years of the present government's five-year term. For now, the two men engage in joint decisionmaking, with Oli heading the government and Dahal taking the lead in party matters.(2)

Regardless of such outcome, the Chand aka Biplav group, has continued to attack symbolic targets for alleged crimes against the people and traditional rivals, such as Nepali Congress, while carefully avoiding actual injury to mainstream Maoists. This is particularly true in illicit fundraising, where all of the numerous and widespread acts of violent extortion have been directed at non-communists such as Nepali Congress. In terms of targeting, the Chandists have stated that they will act as appropriate to deal with state repression. For nearly a year, for instance, entire districts have seen their elected officials, regardless of party, receive radical Maoist letters demanding that they resign or face attack. Carrying through with the threat would be the logical next step.

In fact, there has long since been increased pressure placed upon families and acquaintances in efforts to locate previous Maoist targets who have fled. This pressure and action against located targets has invariably involved violence. Such activity has until last month (March 2019) been met with nearly complete government inaction. Indeed, in the run-up to the current turn of events, the security situation was fraught, with only random efforts of professional security personnel occasionally interrupting local Maoist activity. A warrant for Chand aka Biplav's arrest that was registered 28 February 2018 in the district court of Bhojpur district was struck down for lack of evidence, indicating the astonishingly indifferent manner in which security had been pursued.

At a massive Chand aka Biplav group rally held in central Kathmandu (the capital) on 24 November 2018 – at which police were present but inactive – the group's leadership appeared openly, with Chand aka Biplav himself attending in disguise.



Regardless of such outcome, the Chand aka Biplav group, has continued to attack symbolic targets for alleged crimes against the people and traditional rivals, such as Nepali Congress, while carefully avoiding actual injury to mainstream Maoists.

Faced with such a situation, the government claimed at the time that it would provide security for the general public. Yet it had never done this, was incapable of doing so then, and is not able to do so now. It has never possessed the capability for such action and frequently has also lacked the will, a not surprising reality given that the objects of such action would have to be their estranged but still close comrades. Ironically, it was in the unsettled atmosphere that followed the Kathmandu rally that the government announced in late December 2018 that a Home Ministry-appointed commission, charged with engaging in talks with estranged political forces, announced that “no more conflict exists in the country” – even while admitting it had not actually met with the major armed groups in the country, such as the Chand aka Biplav Maoists, only with less than two dozen minor groups. In such context, observed a Nepali security contact at the time, “The Biplav [Chand] faction has been able to spread fear among the masses.”

Government disingenuousness was thus on full display on 22 February 2019, when the Chand aka Biplav Maoists attacked cell phone towers nationwide in some fifteen simultaneous bombings, which included striking the cellular firm's Lalitpur (Kathmandu) office, killing one and wounding several. It is this event which appears to have driven commentators to slip government-imposed shackles of silence.(3) A veritable explosion of frustrated public discussion followed. Nepali-language newspaper *Nagarik*, for example, editorialized, speaking directly to unstated realities, “Netra Bikram Chand was close to the current Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa who may still have a soft spot for him. It remains to be seen if the Home Ministry will prosecute this case strongly. So far, the government seems to be hurt more by a few bitter words in social media than by such heinous acts.”(4)

The barbed reference was to the communist government's continued efforts to stifle critique of its poor performance and indifferent approach to security. As if on cue to put the lie to the government's repeated claims that “nothing was happening,” February ended with the emergence of wartime weapons that had



It was at this point that the government, on 12 March 2019, finally declared the Chand aka Biplav group to be proscribed. To what extent remains a mystery, as the bellicose verbiage of the NCP is matched by neither the laws available nor the deployment of forces necessary to provide popular security and to staunch radical publicity, recruiting, and fundraising. In many areas, Chand aka Biplav cadre, especially those engaged in political proselytizing and illicit fundraising continue to move and operate openly, interact with the police, and are not touched.

been cached – e.g., a light machinegun and an M16A2 seized from a Chand cadre in the east – followed by a renewed Chand aka Biplav group bombing campaign. The most significant action in the latter was again in the capital, an attack that upon the residence of the head of the Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies (NAFEA) in Kathmandu.

It was at this point that the government, on 12 March 2019, finally declared the Chand aka Biplav group to be proscribed. To what extent remains a mystery, as the bellicose verbiage of the NCP is matched by neither the laws available nor the deployment of forces necessary to provide popular security and to staunch radical publicity, recruiting, and fundraising. In many areas, Chand aka Biplav cadre, especially those engaged in political proselytizing and illicit fundraising continue to move and operate openly, inter-



Figure 2. Chand aka Biplav group agitprop being performed before forced audience in Doti district, 12 December 2018.



Figure 3. Chand combatant training camp captured 16 March 2019. The lines of Nepali text on the banner read: (top) Hail to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; (curved at center) People's Liberation Army, Nepal; (penultimate line) Basic Recruit Training Camp; (last line) No. 2 Company.

act with the police, and are not touched.(5) Actions such as using terrorism to ensure a monopoly of political organizing in local space – by the Chand group and others (e.g., ethnic separatists) – are not contested, as illustrated by Figure 2, which is a Chand aka Biplav agitprop session held 12 December 2018 in Doti district (see Figure 1, Province 7).(6)

Such sessions are common, with songs and skits in local language and forced attendance of students and villagers. Those who attempt to challenge the coercion are met with violence. There are no known instances of the police intervening in such sessions. As popular mobilization goes on, a slice of the recruits is trained, armed, and becomes the “muscle” which eliminates opposition to the Maoist political effort. Figure 3 illustrates this well, as it displays weapons and material captured by the



police in a Chand combatant camp on 16 March 2019.(7) That such preparations have reached the point illustrated highlights that hitherto the communist government has done little to deal with the threat. It has been oblivious to the needs of popular security even as its own paramilitary capability engages in actions not unlike those of breakaway radical Maoist groups.

Challenge of Providing Security

The heart of the matter thus remains the inability of the state, often exacerbated by unwillingness, to provide security for its citizens. Leaving aside motivation, the lack of ability is a function of temporal and geospatial realities. Nepal has for much of its recent history been administered through governmental units based on traditional village areas, with 3,913 Village Development Committees (VDCs) grouped under 75 districts. The VDCs were further divided into Wards (approximately seven per VDC) as dictated by sub-village clusters of settlements (what in most of Asia would be termed hamlets). In this settlement distribution, geography played a premier role. The result is an astonishingly difficult environment within which to provide protection for individuals and organizations.

To secure such a dispersed population (now 28 million) in an area the size of Virginia (if the Himalayas are excluded), was beyond Nepal's capability during the period of overt insurgency (1996-2006), when all forces were committed. It is beyond Nepal's capability now. As an illustration, during the May and June 2017 local elections, when attacks on individuals and property were widespread and quite open, the authorities were tasked with guarding 6,642 polling centers nationally, in addition to normal security duties. Simply assigning 12-18 policemen to each center (a normal distribution) created manpower demands greater than the strength of the entire police force (67,416). Though available elements of the Nepal Army (NA, 95,000) and paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF, a constabulary directed to border security, approximately 40,000) were also deployed, the resulting distribution allowed no security for the general populace. This is always the dilemma for the state, even where there is will.(8)



Today, even if they are so inclined, the police can provide no security to citizens. The police were a primary target during the insurgency and have never fully recovered in terms of national presence. Rolpa district, for instance, discussed in-depth in previous reporting, remains a Chand aka Biplav group clandestine stronghold (in addition to being completely dominated in its overt political structure by the mainstream Maoists and their paramilitary capability). It has a population of approximately 221,000, yet just 600 policemen. This pattern is duplicated throughout the country.

Today, even if they are so inclined, the police can provide no security to citizens. The police were a primary target during the insurgency and have never fully recovered in terms of national presence. Rolpa district, for instance, discussed in-depth in previous reporting, remains a Chand aka Biplav group clandestine stronghold (in addition to being completely dominated in its overt political structure by the mainstream Maoists and their paramilitary capability). It has a population of approximately 221,000, yet just 600 policemen. This pattern is duplicated throughout the country. At present, the other armed government forces, NA and APF, play no significant role in internal security. The former is primarily devoted to United Nations peacekeeping, the latter primarily to border control.

Further, individual and situational cases aside, the performance protocol noted previously, whereby the police are directed not to become involved in "political matters," is nearly universally interpreted by even the most professional officers to dictate non-intervention in any violent activity carried out by a political party or its organs, which in practice refers to the Maoists. This has not changed despite the "banning" of the Chand aka Biplav group. The practical effect is that refusal of mediation or intervention is the norm in cases where personal security is requested, particularly by targeted individuals. Thus terrorism effectively has been relegated to a position as "background noise" and allowed to continue. Such actions, with their fusion of terroristic verbal and physical acts, go on nationwide.

The government itself is part of the problem. Left Alliance behavior in its year in office has supported concerns as to what communist domination would mean. In particular, there have been efforts to neutralize key civil society and external oversight mechanisms, to include the media. The highly regarded Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) annual democracy ratings, released January 2019, place Nepal at 5.18 (of 10) for 2018 and categorize it as a "hybrid regime," occupying the third tier of four, between "flawed democracy" and "authoritarian" on the scale, 97th of 167 in the tables. This positions it between Uganda (5.20) and Kenya (5.11), neither at present lauded in terms of political freedom or public probity. Dahal and the mainstream Maoists openly support dictatorial states such as Venezuela, North Korea, and China and denounce American imperialism for "challenging democracy, sovereignty and peace."(9)

In fact, all sources, both public and private, appear aware of the extent to which the government itself remains divided as to its approach to security, with the mainstream Maoists as a whole opposed to moving against the Chand aka Biplav group (with whom they have maintained direct and indirect contact). It would appear that only the resurrection of an 8 February 2019 police “special bureau” report highlighting the extent to which the situation had deteriorated provoked action by key government figures to the exclusion of consultation with other factions within both the former UML and mainstream Maoist wings.

The report, in addition to highlighting the extent of weapons stockpiling and combatant training, extortion of funds nationwide (to include apparently seeking to buy arms externally; e.g., in India), and plans to attack isolated police posts in the classic arms-gathering tactic of any insurgency, also was said to have a targeting list that moved beyond the acceptable (to the communists) Nepali Congress victims to the communists themselves (to include mainstream Maoists). It was this final element which provoked the 12 March 2019 “banning,” though the analysis that read “hit list” into what was more likely a naming of those to be opposed emerged from a misreading Maoist terminology – supreme irony given that the key debate as to interpretation occurred within the mainstream Maoist faction of the communist government. Not to be dissuaded, the Chand group responded with a nationwide armed strike that shut down many parts of the country.

The risk to targeted individuals posed by muddled government response and conflicted Maoist attitudes towards terrorism is obvious. Yet nothing that has been discussed is new. For decades, even the most prominent individuals have not been safe. Those incidents that make the news are only the most prominent illustrations of terroristic acts that are routine.

The Problem With Ideological Posturing

It is remarkable how similar such context is to that occurring globally, as described, for instance, in recent press dealing with the local level in eastern Germany, where neo-Nazi strength is pronounced, and in the United States itself, where similar degradation of the political process has become widespread. Analysis highlights a point well known when examining political violence: failure to intervene, either through law enforcement or the legal system, only causes extremism to grow.

Not only does such assessment match the situation in Nepal, it is significant that a Maoist figure such as Dahal has consistently refused to condemn political violence – even when holding the highest positions. At an event in December 2016, bringing together communist parties in the country on the birthday of Stalin, the once-again prime minister was reported as opining that “the fundamentals of Marxism cannot be ignored including the armed conflict as a tool to capture the state power.”(10) Both Dahal and Home Minister Thapa have singled out “counter-revolution” and “reactionary forces” as the main threat to the country, whenever challenged concerning the ongoing slide into repression. The terms are Maoist labels for those who favor parliamentary democracy and the market.

Ironically, the same vocabulary and approach inspire the Chand aka Biplav group. The latter, for instance, honored Karl Marx’s

birthday, 5 May 2018, by bringing Nepal to a standstill through an armed strike. Any who sought to resist were attacked). Yet the communist/Maoist government stood by and labelled the assault upon the populace as but “political action.”

The “banning” notwithstanding, Nepal has neither declared the present situation as one of emergency nor passed the necessary laws for dealing with terrorism. In the 12 March 2019 banning, the government moved against the Chand aka Biplav group by using the provisions appropriate to dealing with organized crime. The arrest, on 8 August 2018 in Kathmandu, for example, of Chand aka Biplav faction spokesperson, Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma aka Prakanda (“Profound,” as in intelligent), was on the grounds of extensive acts of party fund-raising by coercion not on charges related to subversion or terrorism. His arrest prompted both demonstrations from supporters and a legal challenge for alleged “fascist suppression.” Ultimately, Bishwakarma was freed due to lack of evidence (a telling indicator of government incapacity) and was the keynote speaker at the 24 November 2018 Chand aka group rally in Kathmandu discussed above (see Figure 4).(11)



Figure 4. Chand aka Biplav Maoists march through Kathmandu on 24 November 2018.



Struggle remains a police action, but army provides bomb squad support and takes casualties.



Despite breathless media coverage – derived, it should be noted, not from inside information but press conferences and releases – arrests of Chand aka Biplav group

members have been relatively few, with but several figures of any organizational stature apprehended. Most of those initially detained have subsequently been released. As confirmed as recently as 9 April 2019 by national police authorities, the overwhelming majority of the arrests that have made the daily headlines have resulted in quick releases with no charges or release on bail (due to the insignificance of the charges). The total number of arrests for the past year was stated by the police as 579, of whom 135 were released after “simple interrogations,” while 338 were brought to court and a majority released on bail.(12)

When charges are actually filed, it is for collateral actions. This is because, as the relevant 2016 annual State Department report correctly notes: “Nepal lacks a law specifically criminalizing terrorism or the provision of material support to terrorist networks. If an act of terrorism were to take place, Nepali courts would likely prosecute the perpetrators on the basis of laws pertaining to its constituent crimes, e.g. murder, arson, etc. Most Nepali officials view Nepal as at low-risk for an international terrorist incident. Accordingly, there is little impetus to introduce new laws.” (13)

What this discussion does not make clear is that in their own treatments, such as that just cited, U.S. and Western sources in general speak only to international terrorism and do not include the domestic variety except as it impacts their citizens. This has caused the ongoing bombings in Nepal and attacks against Nepali individuals to remain largely unpublicized.

Meantime, the communist government has pardoned previously convicted Maoist figures, creating an atmosphere and reality of impunity. Only when actual murder is prominently committed (e.g., in Kathmandu) have the police gone through the motions of responding. It is in fact the terroristic actions in late February and early March 2019, discussed earlier, creating as they did casualties in the heart of Kathmandu, that forced the current move against the Chand aka Biplav group.



Regardless of faction, the Maoists continue to target individuals whom they have identified as enemies and sources of support (especially, money). Fleeing or moving elsewhere does not alter the Maoist efforts, with their attendant threats and actions. Attempts to return to normal life are accompanied by Maoist menace and attacks. Pursuit of targeted individuals has been a central feature of the operations of all Maoist factions and remains unchecked by government action.

Yet the verbiage has not been matched by systematic response, and strategic planning remains crippled by the continued division among the players concerned as to how to proceed. More telling, of course, is the continued embrace of the Chand aka Biplav group by the Maoist mainstream.

Continuing Threat to the Population

Popular security thus remains a pressing concern. In many ways, the situation resembles that in Afghanistan, where two decades of claims of success against the Taliban have resulted not in victory and stability but a steadily declining state of personal security – headlines notwithstanding. Though a formal democracy, Afghanistan is ranked “authoritarian” (the lowest category) in the 2018 EIU Democracy Index (see Para 11, above, wherein Nepal was ranked slightly higher, as “hybrid”); and, like Nepal, it has a high level of corruption and inefficiency, in particular – as concerns this discussion – in the judiciary. Afghanistan’s much larger and capable security forces are no more capable of providing personal security than those of Nepal.

Regardless of faction, the Maoists continue to target individuals whom they have identified as enemies and sources of support (especially, money). Fleeing or moving elsewhere does not alter the Maoist efforts, with their attendant threats and actions. Attempts to return to normal life are accompanied by Maoist menace and attacks. Pursuit of targeted individuals has been a central feature of the operations of all Maoist factions and remains unchecked by government action.

It is especially dangerous now, because it occurs within the context of the intra-Maoist conflict. That conflict, it was noted, concerns how aggressive and ruthless to be in the utilization of terrorism. The precise nature of Maoist terrorist acts hence continues to vary considerably, depending upon the faction and the specific campaign intent. This is especially true in dealing with past enemies, but kidnapping, torture (to include rape), and assault have been and remain common, as does the widespread use of bombs.

The Chand aka Biplav group presently dominates in the use of explosives, with



Classic IEDs (and local weapons)

the mainstream Maoists preferring personal assault utilizing traditional weapons such as kukris (the traditional Nepalese blade associated, in particular, with the Gurkhas) and fighting sticks (lathis). Judging by explanations of targeting protocol provided by senior figures in interviews, the group is oriented towards destruction for the purpose of messaging, even as constant local violence, completely lacking in the glamor of sensational acts such as bombings, are executed to establish local control, recruit, and raise funds through criminality. Significantly, it is normally only the most prominent incidents of any sort that are publicized much less recorded.

This is the norm that challenges victims. On the one hand, the communist government has been focused upon ideological positioning to an extent that has caused it to ignore terroristic violence by one of its key constituent elements, the mainstream Maoists. On the other hand, for the dozen years since the formal end of hostilities, it has been deemed by the same actors as more than acceptable that terrorism be used – by both splinters and the mainstream through its paramilitary capacity – to attack those determined to be enemies. Neither time nor space has altered the nationwide targeting by Maoist local operatives, regardless of faction, of those they feel it necessary to remove from the political playing field and to generate the means for the revolution to continue (e.g., through extortion).

It is this refusal to move beyond a worldview that posits a constant struggle with enemies – even to let past victims go about their lives in the new era of “peace”

– which remains the Maoist norm. In a sense, for the Maoists, this must be so, because neutralizing rival political opposition and tapping their resources remain imperative. In biting commentary, one of Nepal’s most prominent commentators, CK Lal, put the reality thus: “Comparable to the concept of a vegetarian fox, a non-violent Maoist isn’t just an

oxymoron but a ruse intended to fool its victim. In its ideology, peace is possible only by waging a ‘People’s War’. Thus a non-violent Maoist is at best a utopian, often a charlatan, and mostly a cunning carnivore claiming to be a vegan.” (14)

About The Author:

Dr. Marks is a Distinguished Professor and MG Edward Lansdale Chair of Irregular Warfighting Strategy, College of International Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University (NDU), Ft McNair, Washington, DC 20319.

Footnotes:

1. Reported in Anil Giri, “Ruling and Opposition Parties at Odds Over Handling the Chand Outfit,” *The Kathmandu Post*, 26 March 2019; available at: <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-03-26/ruling-and-opposition-parties-at-odds-over-handling-of-the-chand-outfit.html> (accessed 26 March 2019).
2. Precise nature of the relationship at any point in time remains captive to the personalities involved. Excellent discussion may be found in P. Kharel, “Conflict Between Two Chiefs,” *Republica*, 2 October 2018; available at: <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/conflict-between-two-chiefs/> (accessed 17 March 2019).
3. The government has been engaged in a systematic effort to regulate and thus silence hostile voices in the media.
4. “Stop the Extortion,” *Nagarik*, 26 February 2019, translated in *Nepali Times*, 1 March 2019; available at: <https://www.nepalitimes.com/from-the-nepali-press/stop-the-extortion/> (accessed 9 March 2019).
5. In addition to my own sources, Nepali language media, as recently as the last week of March 2019, has offered astonishing testimony to this reality, based on correspondents’ extensive visits to areas outside Kathmandu. No similar reporting has appeared in the English-language media.
6. Photo from Chand aka Biplav social media distribution, provided by Nepali source.
7. Photo from Nepali source.
8. The classic work that mathematically displays the conundrum faced by state forces is Chapter 33 of T.E.

Lawrence (“of Arabia”), *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (1926 edition), 188-196.

9. For democracy rating, see EIU, *Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political Participation, Protest and Democracy* (London: EIU, 2019); available at: http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid=Democracy2018 (accessed 17 March 2019). For Dahal denunciation of the United States, see his signed NCP Press Statement, 25 January 2019, English version (as released by NCP); available within Anil Giri, “Venezuela Quietly Lobbied Nepal’s Ruling Party to Release a Strong Statement Condemning the US and its Allies, Sources Say,” *The Kathmandu Post*, 27 January 2019, at: <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-01-27/venezuela-quietly-lobbied-the-ruling-party-to-release-a-strong-statement-condemning-the-us-and-its-allies-sources-say.html> (accessed 17 March 2019).

10. Rather than a direct quote, the reporting used “has said.” There is little doubt, though, that the words were uttered. See “Fundamentals of Marxism Cannot be Ignored: Dahal,” *The Kathmandu Post*, 27 December 2016; available at: <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-12-27/fundamentals-of-marxism-cannot-be-ignored-dahal.html> (accessed 17 March 2019).

11. Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma as featured in “Biplav Maoist [sic] Shows its Strength in Kathmandu,” *People’s Review*, 25 November 2018; available at: <http://peoplesreview.com.np/biplav-maoist-shows-its-strength-in-kathmandu/> (accessed 17 March 2019).

12. See Biken K Dawadi, “Most Chand Outfit Leaders, Cadres out on Bail: Police,” *Republica*, 9 April 2019; available at: <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/most-chand-outfit-leaders-cadres-out-on-bail-police/> (accessed 11 April 2019). This information aligns with my own sources, which have consistently stated that “most” of those arrested were being released.

13. “Nepal” in *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*; available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272233.htm#NEPAL> (accessed 17 March 2019).

14. CK Lal, “The Maoist Cul-de-sac,” *Republica*, 18 March 2019; available at: <https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/the-maoist-cul-de-sac/?categoryId=blog> (accessed 18 March 2019).



IACSP

Are you Linked?

Join the
IACSP's LinkedIn
 Homeland Security Network
 of Counterterrorism &
 Security Professionals.

Get linked today!

For more info contact:
homelandsecuritynetwork@iacsp.com

For Security Professionals Only