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Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review

Organization

	Executive Summary	Page 1
I.	Introduction	Page 8
II.	Interests and Objectives	Page 10
III.	Strategic and Operational Environment	Page 14
IV.	U.S. Strategy	Page 24
V.	Budget, Resources, and Reforms	Page 28

This is obviously no

Office (CBO) estimates of $64 billion by 2015. At any given budget level, the increasing costs of health care are in competition with the costs of maintaining high levels of modernization and readiness of our forces.

W K H 5 X V V L D Q L Q Y D V L R Q R I & U L P H D D Q G R Q J R L Q J W K U H D W conclusion ± a conclusion that echoes several previous reviews ± that Europe is a net producer of security. If that is to remain the case, NATO must bolster the security of its own frontline states, especially in the Baltics and across southern Europe but also in Poland, lest they be subject to intimidation and subversion. America must lead the alliance in this regard.

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fighters to plan and prosecute attacks against the United States and its allies and partners;

3.

In fact, we believe W K L V H U R V L R Q R I - $ P H U L F D ¶ V P L O L W D U \

IV: U.S. Strategy

As with its broad strategic objectives, the American tradition in military strategy has been remarkably consistent since the end of World War II: the United States has sought to secure its global interests by deterring adversaries and reassuring allies through a combination of globally

nuclear weapons in its defense strategy and to seek mutual reductions in the number of nuclear weapons with Russia, they nonetheless continue to play a unique and crucial role.

amounts Secretary Gates proposed were sufficient or not, his budget would have permitted the

hollow force.Second, the increases above quester levels proposed thus far, while desirable, are nowhere near enough to remedy the damage which the Department has suffered and enable it to

Independent Panel recommended a Presidential commission to study holistic compensation reform. This commission is now at work. We believe it unwise to judge its conclusions. However, four years ago the first Independent Panel addressed the subject of compensation reform. We continue to support its basic conclusions:

- A failure to address the increasing costs of the All Volunteer Force will likely result in a reduction in force structure, readiness, modernization, a decrease in benefits or a compromised All

Additional changes are required to right size the civilian Defense Department and federal contracting workforces. Pentagon civilians have continued to grow even after the active duty forces have been shrinking for some time. From 2001 to 2012, the active duty military grew by 3.4 percent while at the same time the size of the USG civilian workforce in the Department has grown by 15% to over 800,000. CBO calculates that the rising costs of civilian pay accounts for two-thirds of projected growth in operations and maintenance spending in the next decade. Clearly, controlling or reducing civilian pay costs is essential to ensuring that the operations and maintenance accounts can be effectively leveraged to provide for the readiness of the Joint F f 024 ,000.

VI. Readiness, Posture, Capabilities, and

this strategy in light of

conducting strategic strike missions but also operating in concert with other parts of the Joint Force. 7KH ³DJH RI $PHULFDQ DLUSRZHU´ UHDFKHG DQ DSRJHH Operation Desert Storm and the Balkans wars. Now this advantage is being called into question,

Strategic Lift and Logistical sustainment.With a global mission set, the United States military

joint operations and, as befits its global mission, must possess a wide range of capabilities on land, on the sea, in the air, in space and in the cyber realm. It must be durable, sustainable and powerful at great distance yet also globally agile. It must balance capability and capacity,

We offer some cautions later in this section as to why superior capability is not always a substitute for capacity but perhaps the most persuasive rationale came during the course of several interviews with Geographic Combatant Commanders who clearly called for more capacity to meet the requirements of contingency plans, regional presence, and theater security cooperation and engagement. While we are aware that post-war reductions in overall defense resources are a normal historical pattern

phase addresses the urgent need for capacity by projecting and increasing force size while

VII. Strategic Risk

The growing gap between the strategic objectives the U.S. military is expected to achieve and the resources required to do so is causing risk to accumulate toward unacceptable levels. There are many tools the United States uses to reduce risk and execute foreign and national security

APPENDICES

sequestration. The 6 funding on force structure is truly appalling. 10 fewer ships in the Navy, 70

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Appendix 4

Enabling Legislation

10 U.S.C. § 118: US Code - Section 118: Quadrennial Defense Review

(C) Two by the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(D) Two by the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(3) Co-cha

Appendix 5

National Defense Panel Plenary Schedule

August 20, 2013

September 24, 2013

Appendix 6

Consultations

Current U.S. Administration Officials

Robert Scher	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia
Chris Smith	

National Intelligence Council

Daniel Flynn

Alphonso Maldon, JR	Chairman, Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission
Frank Miller	Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College
Barry Pavel	Atlantic Council
Robert Work	Center for a New American Security
Larry Wortzel	Representative, U.S. China Commission

Appendix 7

QDR National Defense Panel Member Biographies

General Cartwright currently serves as the inaugural holder of the Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies for the Center for Strategic & International Studies. In addition, General Cartwright serves as a member of The Raytheon Company Board of Directors, a Harvard Belfer

He received a B.A. in History and Government from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from Yale University.

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Terrorism strategy. His team coordinated key implementation plans against terrorist groups and assessed the efforts to achieve stated goals as well as provided input to the Office df

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs during 2011 and 2012. His courses at Princeton focused upon the limited utility of American military force.

In Congress Jim served on the Armed Services, Agriculture, and Financial Services committees. His Armed Services subcommittees were Readiness and Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and

the Air Force Research Laboratory; all personnel and infrastructure required to support the

Appendix 8

QDR National Defense Panel Support Staff

Paul D. Hughes
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